Norwegian extraterritoriality in China. A study of how and why Norway abolished its extraterritoriality in China by Tepstad, Jens Einar Fauskanger
His 350 Jens Tepstad i 
 
Norwegian Extraterritoriality in China 




Master Thesis in History 
Department of Archeology, History, Cultural- and Religious Studies 
University of Bergen 
November 2015 
 




One of the issues that comes to mind when mentioning "Sino-Norwegian relations" 
today, is the recent disagreement between the two countries regarding the granting of 
the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to the Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo. China 
reacted by holding the Norwegian government responsible for the Peace Price 
Committee's decision to award the price to an individual the Chinese government 
deemed to be both a criminal and a troublemaker. Norway is however, far from the only 
country that have criticized the Chinese government on humanitarian grounds. The 
United States has continuously pressed for a halt in the Chinese government’s practice 
of arresting activists, limiting religious practices within the country and blocking access 
to websites deemed inappropriate. However, it is not only in recent times that the West 
has considered its own principles to be universally applicable and attempted to impose 
them on non-Western countries like China. Nearly two centuries ago normative 
disagreements led to foreign states enjoying "extraterritoriality” in China over a period of 
roughly one hundred years. Even though Norway was not characterized neither by 
colonialism nor imperialism, it was still one of the states that attained extraterritoriality for 
its citizens in China.  
After exploring the issues surrounding foreign extraterritoriality in China, I decided that 
this was the topic I wanted to investigate in my master thesis. This topic is exciting and 
important for two reasons. Firstly, Norwegian extraterritoriality in China is a topic to 
which not much academic attention has been devoted. Secondly, the scholars who have 
researched extraterritoriality have primarily focused on the relationship between the 
Western great powers and China; and mainly on the relations between Great Britain and 
China. This makes it interesting to explore how a small nation like Norway positioned 
itself in these affairs. Hence I decided to study the Norwegian participation in the 
abolition-process that ultimately ended Norwegian extraterritoriality in China.     
I want to express my thanks to all who have helped and supported me in my study. First 
and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor Camilla Brautaset for her commitment 
and guidance throughout the whole process. I would also like to express my gratitude to 
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Christhard Hoffmann and all the others in the seminar “På tvers av grenser” (Across 
international borders) who have provided me with helpful and constructive criticism 
throughout the writing process. I will also express my sincere gratitude to all who have 
helped me by proofreading my text.  
And finally I would like to express my sincere thanks to the project: “Merchants and 
Missionaries” for a scholarship, in addition to important support for my work. This is a 
project that researches Norwegian encounters with China in a transnational perspective, 
1890–1937, which is hosted by the Department of AHKR and funded by the Norwegian 
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 The International Landscape in East Asia during the Early 1920s 
 
1 
                                            
1
 Self-made Illustration of the international borders in East Asia during the early 1920s 
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Chapter I  
Thesis Introduction 
 
 1.1 The Topic  
 
Throughout history empires have made use of law and imperial courts to exercise their 
own adaptations and interpretations of law and order. During the 18th, 19th, and early 
20th centuries, also referred to as the Age of Imperialism, there was acceleration in the 
global expansion of European and North American interests. Throughout these 
processes it became increasingly commonplace for these states to implement a judicial 
system known as "extraterritoriality" in countries they deemed to have a judicial practice 
inferior to their own. These systems came into place through treaties, where the host 
country had to concede parts of its jurisdictional sovereignty through granting the 
citizens of the signatory powers the right to remain legal subjects of their home country, 
even when on foreign soil.  
This master thesis addresses one of the most hotly debated historical phenomena of 
extraterritoriality we know of, namely the extraterritorial system that unfolded during the 
last Chinese dynasty, the Qing dynasty, and during the existence of the first Chinese 
republic. Starting in 1842, this system of extraterritoriality lasted just over a century as it 
was formally abolished in 1943. The historian John K. Fairbank was a pioneer to 
describe this period as the Treaty Century,2 a term often used in contemporary Chinese 
historiography. When using the term “treaty powers” in this thesis it refers to the 
countries that attained extraterritorial rights through a treaty with China.3  
                                            
2
 Fairbank, John K. & Merle Goldman. 2006. [1992]. China a New History (2nd enlarged ed.) USA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 201 
3
 These countries were originally: Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Soviet Union, Mexico, Belgium, Italy, 
Spain, Denmark, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, France, United Kingdom, Japan, 
Netherlands, and the United States. 
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Most of the literature on this topic has tended to focus on treaties where major 
geopolitical powers such as the United States and Great Britain were signatory powers.4 
However, the focus of this thesis is on a hereto largely untold history through studying 
one of the more unknown treaty parties in China, Norway. Norway and Norwegian 
citizens in China enjoyed extraterritorial rights as early as from 1847 onwards. This was 
a treaty that was made between Sweden-Norway and China while Norway was the 
junior partner in a personal union with Sweden. This treaty will be further elaborated on 
later in this thesis. The focus of this thesis is however, not on the beginning, but rather 
on the end of this history through studying the processes that led Norway to concede its 
extraterritorial rights in China in 1943. 
Extraterritoriality is a deeply inflamed subject that still upsets many Chinese. It is not 
difficult to see the unfairness in how foreign powers dictated how China had to 
reorganize its bureaucracy and judicial practices to be considered "civilized". China was 
among the non-Western countries where foreign jurisdiction was forcefully implemented. 
This happened during the aftermath of the First Opium War (1839–1842) between 
Britain and the Qing dynasty.5 The Qing dynasty then suffered a major defeat against 
Britain; the main reasons for this defeat were China’s lack in military naval strength, 
maneuverability and organization compared to the British.6 China was never a formal 
colony of any foreign power; however, by the 1920s China was the only nation 
remaining that was still entirely bound by a fully-fledged extraterritorial legal order.7 
Extraterritoriality is said to have been enforced upon China because the Westerners 
considered Chinese law to be “barbaric” and “unjust”.  
The political scientist Turan Kayaoğlu points to three reasons for the general Western 
resentment towards the Chinese laws. Firstly, (before 1911) the Chinese legal codes 
were not accessible to the public and therefore the foreigners had little knowledge of 
them. Secondly, the traditional Chinese laws did not ensure civil and property rights to 
                                            
4
 Some examples are Gerrit Gong - The Standard of ‘Civilization’ (1984), Turan Kayaoğlu - Legal 
Imperialism (2010); & Shogo Suzuki - Civilization and Empire (2009) 
5
 The Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) was the last imperial dynasty to rule China. 
6
 Westad, Odd Arne. 2012. Restless Empire China and the World Since 1750 Great Britain: The Bodley 
Head pp. 41-44  
7
 Cassel, Pär Kristoffer. 2012. Grounds of Judgment - Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-
Century China and Japan New York: Oxford University Press p. 6 
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individuals. And thirdly, China's judicial system was not separated from its administrative 
structure.8  
Several other foreign states followed the British example and sought to make similar 
treaties of their own with the Qing dynasty. The new treaties did not only deal with 
foreign extraterritoriality, they also significantly altered the strict restrictions that China 
had imposed on foreign merchants previously. Earlier the British merchants had been 
constricted to trading only in the port city Guangzhou. Following the British victory in the 
First Opium War, the trading rights were extended to permit British merchants to trade 
with anyone they liked in five different ports cities along the Chinese coast.9 However, 
extraterritoriality has often been referred to as an unfair system since China was not 
returned the same privileges. The historian Dong Wang offers an in depth account on 
how the treaties between China and foreign states have come to be referred to as the 
“Unequal Treaties” in Chinese history, public memory as well as by Chinese politicians 
today.10 She points to how this term was popularized during the rise of Nationalism in 
China in the late 1910s.11 She also pinpoints that this term was not only used as a 
means to challenge extraterritoriality on normative grounds, but also to gain popular 
support in China.12 After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, the first Chinese republic 
started a process attempting to revise the treaties concluded with foreign countries. The 
negotiations were in the hands of a foreign educated governmental elite with an 
understanding of Western diplomatic norms and procedures.13 This process towards the 
abolishment of all foreign extraterritorial rights lasted up to the Second World War era.  
Furthermore, Kayaoğlu explains that this development may be divided into three 
different strategic stages. The first strategy was to confront extraterritoriality on 
normative grounds. The second strategy was to challenge extraterritoriality on the 
grounds of its legal inefficiency and lack of justice. The third strategy was to initiate a 
                                            
8
 Kayaoğlu, Turan. 2010. Legal Imperialism - Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman 
Empire and China New York: Cambridge University Press p. 162 
9
 Westad, Restless Empire p. 44 
10
 Wang, Dong. 2005. China’s Unequal Treaties  Narrating National History United Kingdom: Lexington 
Books p. 10 
11
 Ibid. p. 64 
12
 Ibid. pp. 68-70 
13
 Wang, China’s Unequal Treaties  p. 35 
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legal institution building in order to fulfill the Western states’ requirements for the 
establishment of a unified legal system with codified laws, a uniform court system, as 
well as a legal hierarchy. He further highlights that it was the third strategy that proved to 
be the most successful.14 
The era of the “Treaty Century” and “Unequal Treaties” is today still considered a thorn 
in China's national pride by many Chinese. One example of this can be found in the 
editorial of the Economist magazine in August 2015 where it is argued that the Chinese 
Communist party actively exploits perceptions of historical foreign aggression and 
humiliation of China to justify its present day ambitions.15   
In order to proceed to undertake a meaningful analysis and discussion for this research, 
it is paramount to determine what is meant by the term “extraterritoriality” and how it was 
practiced by the foreigners in China. Kayaoğlu defines extraterritoriality as: "a legal 
regime whereby a state claims exclusive jurisdiction over its citizens in another state".16 
He highlights that within world politics extraterritorial jurisdiction is used within the 
boundaries of another state as opposed to territorial jurisdiction which is used within the 
state's own borders.17 The historian Odd Arne Westad emphasizes that extraterritoriality 
implied that all citizens from nations that acquired a treaty with China were fully exempt 
from the Chinese laws, and rather followed their own countries’ jurisdiction.18 Within the 
boundaries of this thesis, the extraterritoriality that was practiced will be understood by 
the above mentioned definition by Kayaoğlu.     
Kayaoğlu argues that during the 19th century Western jurists, diplomats and statesmen 
had redefined the principles of sovereignty. He explains that Non-European states were 
classified as non-sovereign entities, and how this then justified European intervention 
and colonization.19 Kayaoğlu draws attention to something vital when examining primary 
sources on extraterritoriality. It might be tempting for a “Western historian” to adhere to 
the Eurocentric view considering extraterritoriality as a means to modernize the non-
                                            
14
 Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism pp. 48-50 
15
 (Leader) 2015. ”Xi’s history lessons” The Economist (Vol. 416 Num. 8951) p. 11 
16
 Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism p. 2 
17
 Ibid. p. 2 
18
 Westad, Restless Empire p. 44 
19
 Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism p. 10 
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Western countries. However, this thesis will not dedicate attention to examining 
extraterritoriality on normative grounds. Even so keeping Kayaoğlu’s point of view in 
mind is important when examining Norwegian primary sources that are biased towards 
the Western position.  
The historian Pär Kristoffer Cassel brings up something equally important in his book: 
Grounds of Judgment - Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century 
China and Japan (2012). He says that one may assume that extraterritoriality was a 
system used for geopolitical rivalry in what Westerners believed to be the non-civilized 
world. However, in his view this could not be further from the truth. The foreigners often 
worked together in order to gain collective rights for themselves. The post Opium War 
negotiations between France and the Qing dynasty opened the possibility to revise the 
treaty after twelve years. Hence France, Britain and the United States had all agreed to 
act in consensus to secure a revision of the treaties that benefited them all.20  
The major foreign powers used extraterritoriality as a means of extending their authority 
over China. As mentioned previously, Norway was among the ranks of foreign nations 
that enjoyed and practiced extraterritoriality in China. Yet the Norwegian 
extraterritoriality is a largely unexplored field of Norwegian international history. Over the 
last few years the general topic of extraterritoriality has experienced a growing interest 
from intellectuals in several different academic fields.  
Kayaoğlu highlights that while researching extraterritoriality many scholars have focused 
their studies primarily on British extraterritoriality through the study of British legal 
imperialism up to the 1930s.21 Such a focus has been taken due to Britain’s hegemonic 
position in international politics up to that time. This fact makes it interesting to expand 
the perimeter of research by looking at how a small nation like Norway participated in 
the extraterritoriality discourse until the system was abolished in the mid 1940s. This 
thesis will not only contribute to the general study of the history of extraterritoriality in 
China, but more specifically to the study of the history of Sino-Norwegian diplomacy.  
 
                                            
20
 Cassel, Grounds of Judgment p. 56 
21
 Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism p. 61 
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 1.2 Research Question and Methodological Framework 
  
The main research question for this thesis is: How and why did Norway abolish its 
extraterritoriality in China? This study will address this overall research question 
through the investigation of closely related sub-research questions. Such an approach 
permits me to study this overlying question from slightly different angles throughout the 
analytical chapters. Nonetheless, the answering of the research question will require 
examining how the abolishment-discourse regarding extraterritoriality in China unfolded. 
It is important to keep in mind that this discourse developed more or less independently 
of Norway. Extraterritoriality in China was a system that had been practiced from the 
outcome of the First Opium War and which lasted until the Second World War period. 
The British Empire was the first foreign power that enjoyed this system, but other foreign 
powers quickly followed in Britain’s footsteps. Norway was among the ranks of these 
foreign nations that enjoyed extraterritoriality in China. Norway attained its 
extraterritoriality during the Swedish-Norwegian union. Sweden-Norway had closely 
examined the outcome of the First Opium War which opened up commercial 
opportunities for Swedish-Norwegian interests in China. Sweden-Norway and the Qing 
dynasty signed the treaty of Canton in 1847 that granted Swedish and Norwegian 
citizens extraterritorial rights in China.22 After Norway gained independence from 
Sweden in 1905 Norwegian extraterritoriality still prevailed even though a new bilateral 
agreement was not made between the two countries until 1928.23 Norway being one of 
the nations enjoying extraterritorially, participated in many diplomatic processes 
regarding the continuance of extraterritoriality. It is this participation that is at the heart of 
this thesis including exploring how the discourse developed. This thesis will research the 
reasons that ultimately made Norway abolish its extraterritoriality in China. It is important 
to keep in mind that Norway was one of the smaller states that enjoyed extraterritoriality 
there. This study will focus on the causes that were important for why a small state 
                                            
22
 Cassel, Grounds of Judgment p. 56 
23
 Norway the official site in China. Oversikt over gjeldende avtaler mellom Norge og Kina (Overview of 
current treaties between Norway and China) Accessed on: November 07. 2015 Accessible from: 
<http://www.norway.cn/Documents/Oversikt%20over%20gjeldene%20avtaler%20mellom%20Norge%20o
g%20Kina.pdf> 
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relinquished its extraterritoriality in China. Bearing this in mind it is central to emphasize 
that these reasons may differ slightly from the causes that motivated the great powers to 
end their extraterritorial privileges.  
 
 1.2.1 Delimitation of Time 
 
The overall timeframe of this research is from when Norway acquired its independence 
from Sweden in 1905 until Norwegian extraterritoriality in China was abolished in 1943. 
The Norwegian independence from Sweden marked a new era for Norwegian history. 
This signaled the start of an independent Norwegian foreign policy. However, in spite the 
fact that Norway sent Thorvald Hansen (1864-1914) to Shanghai as its Consul-General 
in 1906,24 the consolidation from the old joint diplomatic service into a new independent 
one took some time. Because of this Norwegian diplomatic interests in the Chinese 
capital were handled by the British legation up until 1919.25  
The focus of this thesis, however, is at the end game of Norwegian extraterritoriality in 
China. Hence, researching in this thesis how and why Norway abolished its 
extraterritoriality in China, the cases that were handled by the British are not relevant. 
The primary focus is set on the period when Norway handled its own diplomatic relations 
in China from 1919 onwards until the abolition of the Norwegian extraterritoriality in 
1943.  
Kayaoğlu defines the abolition of extraterritoriality as: “Britain's decision to accept non-
Western jurisdiction over British citizens living in a given state."26 The reason Kayaoğlu 
focuses his definition on Britain is because its hegemonic position permitted it to 
dominate the legal episteme. He argues that Britain was the precedent setter whose 
initiative was regularly followed by other foreign states especially during the 19th 
                                            
24 Svarverud, Rune. 1999. "I Shanghais tjeneste. Nordmenn i Shanghai før 1. verdenskrig" Historie Vol. 2-
99. p. 47 
25
 Arkivportalen. Utenriksstasjonene, Ambassaden/Legasjonen i Beijing, (The Legation in Beijing) 
Accsessed on: Feburary 24. 2015. Accessible from: 
<http://www.arkivportalen.no/side/arkiv/detaljer?arkivId=no-a1450-01000001354675>  
26
 Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism p. 61 
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century.27 He further points to how international factors influenced extraterritoriality in the 
change of distribution of power. Russia becoming the Soviet Union in 1917, embraced 
an anti-imperialistic policy and relinquished Russian extraterritoriality entirely.28 Britain’s 
hegemonic position declined during the 20th century and the United States became the 
leading power on the issue of extraterritoriality in the 1930s and 1940s.29 Just as other 
foreign states had rapidly followed in Britain's footsteps issuing unequal treaties; they 
also followed Britain and the United States’ joint example when it came to ending their 
extraterritoriality. Norway was no exception to this rule since it ended its extraterritoriality 
later the same year as Britain and the United States. Norway like other lesser foreign 
powers simply followed the Anglo-American example. However, Norway offers a 
valuable lens of studying how smaller states operated within the system of 
extraterritoriality. How much room of maneuver did a small country like Norway really 
have on the stage of international politics.  
 
1.2.2 Clarifications Regarding the Terms used in this Research 
 
When I refer to "the treaty powers" I mean the states that had managed to acquire an 
unequal treaty with China that granted its citizens various privileges such as 
extraterritoriality. Most of the treaty powers were states located in Europe or countries 
that had close cultural and historical ties to Europe such as the United States. However, 
Japan was also among the treaty powers and was the only Asian state that had acquired 
an unequal treaty with China. In my definition of “the great powers” I differ slightly from 
the general historical classification of the great powers in the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The reason for this is that I am primarily focusing on the East Asian Region, 
where for instance Germany had lost much of its influence as a result of its defeat in the 
First World War. I will define the great powers as the countries that signed "the Four-
                                            
27
 Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism p. 61 
28
 Ibid. p. 64 
29
 Ibid. p. 64 
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Power Treaty" during the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922.30 When I refer to 
“the great powers” throughout my thesis I specifically mean: the British Empire, the 
United States, Japan and France, unless I state otherwise.  
 
 1.2.3 Clarifications on old Colonial names of Asian Cites and Countries 
  
Many Asian cities and countries had different English names during the era of 
extraterritoriality than the ones that are currently used. I have decided to disregard the 
former colonial names throughout my thesis and instead make use of their current 
Pinyin31 and/or English names.32 When approaching the subject I consider this the most 
neutral and impartial classification. Additionally it is also easier for the reader to follow 
my arguments when I refer to the names that are used today. For this reason I will use 
“Guangzhou” instead of its old name “Canton”. I will also make use of modern spellings 
such as “Beijing" instead of “Peking”. Additionally I will refer the modern names of 
countries such as “Thailand” instead of “Siam”.  
 
 1.3 Literature and Research Status 
 
In the following I will outline and discuss the research literature that has been relevant to 
my thesis, as well as provide a brief assessment of “the state of the art” with regards to 
research on extraterritoriality in China. I have divided the literature into three main 
categories.  
The first category contains earlier research on extraterritoriality. Most of these studies 
that have been used as groundwork for this thesis have not been written by historians 
                                            
30
 I will address the Washington Conference in greater detail due to its importance for my research later on 
in the thesis.  
31
 Pinyin is the official phonetic system for transcribing the pronunciations of Chinese characters into the 
Latin alphabet. 
32
 The only exception is when I directly quote someone who uses the old terminologies. 
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but rather by political scientist. Political scientists tend to attempt to apply political 
theories to explain the outcome of historical events, while historians focus more on 
finding the connections between events, empirically as well as theoretically. Another 
issue that might be worth mentioning is that the studies done by political scientists tend 
to focus on explaining China's integration into “International Society” through political 
processes. Though these works of political scientists tend to have a different approach 
to sources and historical context than historical studies, they nevertheless offer highly 
valuable perspectives on the history of extraterritoriality in China.  
The second category is devoted to major works by historians addressing the history of 
China’s relationship with the wider world. The last category is dedicated to academic 
works concerning the Norwegian diplomatic service as well as the Norwegian foreign 
policy during the period in question here.  
 
 1.3.1 Specialist Studies Regarding Extraterritoriality 
 
The American political scientist Gerrit Gong’s The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in 
International Society (1984) has been regarded as a turning point in the study of 
extraterritoriality. Here Gong investigates how the (largely European) "International 
Society" demanded that Non-Western states had to adopt the essentially Western 
principles that he coins as the "standards of civilization". This study examines how 
Turkey, China, Japan and Thailand made attempts to conform to the necessary 
adjustments while still retaining their cultural individuality and their own concepts of 
diplomacy. Gong has been interpreted as a proponent for what is often referred to as 
“The English School Scholars” or “liberal realism”, which characteristically tends to 
stress the role of legal ideas and institutions in world politics.33  
However, more recent research such as that offered by Turan Kayaoğlu, has argued 
that this approach is an insufficient framework for dealing with this subject as it fails to 
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offer “a robust account of the expansion of international society in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.”34 
The single most important work for this research has been Turan Kayaoğlu’s Legal 
Imperialism Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China 
(2010). Here, Kayaoğlu investigates how successful China, Japan and the Ottoman 
Empire were in abolishing extraterritoriality within their own borders. He argues that the 
successes or failures of these attempts are explained by whether the West perceived 
the states to have created efficient Western-styled institutions that protected the legal 
rights of Western citizens, or not. This study provides an in depth understanding of how 
the extraterritoriality discussions in China developed and places them within a 
comparative perspective. This has been highly valuable for the purpose of this master 
thesis, and it has been an ambition to let this thesis enter into the academic dialogue 
that Kayaoğlu invites his readers into.    
Shogo Suzuki is another scholar who challenges the earlier works presented by the 
English School. In his research: Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter 
with European International Society (2009) he investigates the “darker aspects” of the 
means "International Society" used to introduce "civilization" into China and Japan. In 
doing so he challenges earlier works that have presented the European dominated 
"International Society" as something inherently progressive. Suzuki argues that 
"International Society" had a rather hypocritical approach towards Non-Western states 
because it pressured "civilization" upon them at the same time as it emphasized 
cooperative relations between its "civilized" members. Since this thesis will draw heavily 
on Norwegian diplomatic primary sources that might be characterized as biased, 
Suzuki’s point of view is vital to keep in mind to attain a balanced view on the subject.        
Another important work for this thesis has been the historian Dong Wang’s study: 
China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History (2012). This is one of several 
academic studies she has written on topics regarding China and the outside world. Here 
she presents an in-depth study based upon primary sources about how the expression 
"unequal treaties" has been used in recent Chinese history. She reveals how opposing 
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Chinese forces have narrated and adjusted the history of the term "unequal treaties" to 
strengthen their own effort to achieve national unity and political sovereignty.35 In doing 
so she also looks into how China's struggle against these treaties shaped its use of 
international law. This study has been vital for my research for the same reasons as 
Kayaoğlu’s book. It has also been crucial for gaining a more balanced approach since it 
offers an understanding of the topic based upon Chinese primary sources.  
Furthermore, Pär Kristoffer Cassel’s study: Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and 
Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan (2012) supplemented by his 
article: Traktaten som aldrig var och fördraget som nästan inte blev (The Convention 
that never was and the Treaty that almost never became) (2010) have been most 
significant for understanding the establishment of extraterritoriality in China. Cassel 
explores the legal encounters that occurred during the nineteenth century between 
Western states and China, and how these encounters resulted in treaties that granted 
the Westerners nearly full immunity from Chinese laws and jurisdiction. He also 
analyzes how these treaties created a new legal order in China and how this course was 
fundamentally different from the colonial relationships that Western states formed with 
other Asian countries. Another reason why these studies are interesting for this thesis is 
because they closely examine another important dimension about the Swedish-
Norwegian extraterritoriality in China.  
I have not been able to find any academic studies that specifically research how 
Norway, after becoming an independent state in 1905, addressed the continuance of its 
extraterritorially in China or the reasons for why Norway eventually relinquished its 
extraterritoriality there. Hence the mentioned academic works have been used as a 
foundation for understanding the general course of events that ultimately ended 
Norwegian extraterritoriality in China.    
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 1.3.2 Research Literature on China and the Wider World 
 
There is a well of historical works on China and the wider world, and for the purpose of 
this thesis I have had to be selective. Three scholars have had particular impact on this 
thesis, representing a standard reference on the broader history of China, and an 
updated revisionist account of China’s relationship with the world as well as a more 
specialist study on the period in question here. 
The historian Jonathan D. Spence’s book: the Search for Modern China (1999) is 
regarded as a standard reference introduction into modern Chinese history.36 It has 
provided a broad overview of general Chinese history, as well as the history of China’s 
relationship with other countries and regions in a long-run perspective.  
The most significant for this thesis is, however, the historian Odd Arne Westad's book: 
Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (2012). Westad looks into the internal 
developments in China over the last 250 years. In doing so Westad challenges earlier 
works that can be traced back as far as to Max Weber. Such works depicted the Qing 
dynasty as stagnating and fragile. By incorporating contemporary studies, Westad 
argues convincingly that China was in fact not as weak as previously assumed. One 
example is how he claims that China was on par with Western states during the early 
18th century in terms of its economy, productivity as well as its general standard of living. 
Westad puts more emphasis on China's internal problems such as overextension, riots 
and rebellions combined with a nearly empty treasury when explaining its troubles rather 
than over-exaggerating the impact of European dominance over the country. Westad’s 
account is representative of what might be referred to as a revisionist school, which from 
the late 1990s onwards increasingly has challenged the works of previous generations 
of historians.  
Finally, Collin Mackerras' book: China in Transformation: 1900-1949 (2008) has been a 
useful reference for this thesis. This book deals specifically with China during the time 
that is being researched. Mackerras narrates how this important period in Chinese 
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history saw enormous changes throughout all areas of Chinese society. He describes 
the Chinese eras of revolution, civil war and occupation in addition to exploring the 
development of Chinese nationalism, modernization and the general transformation of 
Chinese society.  
 
 1.3.3 Studies of the History of Norwegian Diplomacy and Foreign Policy  
 
This thesis addresses the abolition of Norwegian extraterritoriality in China. Hence it is 
important to establish a broader understanding of Norwegian foreign policy and 
diplomacy in order to be able to contextualize, interpret and explain Norway’s policy 
towards China in these matters.  
An important reference here has been: Norway’s Foreign Relations – a History (2001) as 
well as the article: Ideal og eigeninteresser, Utviklinga av den norske utanrikspolitske 
tradisjonen (2003) (Ideals and self-interests The development of the Norwegian foreign 
policy tradition) written by the Norwegian historian Olav Riste. Two historical book series 
which cover the establishment and development of the Norwegian diplomatic service 
and foreign policy have also been useful for this thesis. The first series is called:  Norsk 
utenrikspolitikks historie (The history of Norwegian foreign policy). The first volume in 
this series titled: Norge på egen hånd 1905-1920 (1995) (Norway on its own) written by 
the historian Roald Berg, deals with the forming years of Norwegian foreign policy. 
Furthermore, the second volume in the series titled: Mellomkrigstid 1920-1940 (1996) 
(Interwar period) written by the historian Odd-Bjørn Fure has also provided relevant 
background for this study. The second series, Norsk Utenrikstjeneste (The Norwegian 
Foreign Service) written by the historian Reidar Omang has also provided information for 
understanding the Norwegian foreign policy at the time. I have used both the first volume 
titled: Grunnlegende År (1955) (Founding years) and the second volume named: 
Stormfulle tider (1959) (Wuthering times). A vital point in Norwegian political history from 
1905 onwards, was the importance of maintaining good relations with Britain in all 
respects.   
His 350 Jens Tepstad 15 
 
A further valuable work has been: Aktiv og Avventende – Utenrikstjenestens liv 1905-
2005 (2005) (Prepared and Ready – The foreign service’s activities 1905-2005) written 
by the political scientists Iver. B. Neumann and Halvard Leira. This study has provided 
valuable insight, as well as offering a key to deal with the primary sources since it 
presents a glossary of the historical meanings of both general and Norwegian diplomatic 
titles. Furthermore, the anthology: Small State Status Seeking Norway's quest for 
international standing (2015) especially the article by Halvard Leira titled: The formative 
years has been highly useful for gaining further insight into the subject. This book is 
edited by the political scientists Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann, and it 
contains several articles written by many authors including Halvard Leira.  
I have also found some use in the popular-history book: I Yangzidragens Rike (In the 
Realm of the Yangzi dragon) (2000) written by Stein Seeberg and Gunnar Filseth. This 
book deals with many aspects of the daily lives of the Norwegians (including the 
diplomats) who lived in Shanghai. This is a popular-history book and not an academic 
historical work and has sparked controversy,37 but it has been useful in supplementing 
information on the subject, even though it cannot be used as a historical reference-work.    
 
 1.4. Approaching the Sources   
 
Through the reading of all these studies, the discourse (reading texts to provide an 
overall historical pattern)38 on extraterritoriality has emerged. It provides a broad 
understanding of how the treaty powers viewed extraterritoriality as a concept and a 
reality that would remain until the Non-Western states had westernized their legal 
institutions.  
                                            
37
 Helle underlines in her master thesis that two of the initial authors of this book pulled out from this 
project due to a disagreement on how to approach the primary sources - Helle, Ingrid. 2012. Med verdifull 
last (with valuable cargo) (Master Thesis) Bergen: Universitet i Bergen p 14 
38
 Andresen, Astri. Sissel Rosland, Teemu Ryymin, & Svein Atle Skålevåg 2015. [2012] Å Gripa fortida (To 
seize the past) Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget p. 115 
His 350 Jens Tepstad 16 
 
The most basic distinction made in historical methodology is between primary and 
secondary sources. The historian Ludmilla Jordanova points to primary sources being 
original documents from the time one is studying, and which bear direct witness to every 
kind of event from the time.39 Secondary sources on the other hand, are the writings of 
other scholars. However, Jordanova problematizes this distinction. She points to the fact 
that the status of sources will change according to the research project in question. She 
claims however, that this distinction is less central than whether the source is relevant 
for the project or not. She further stresses the importance of using a large variety of 
sources because they will jointly generate better insight than using only one type of 
source.40 In this thesis I have made use of a large variety of both primary and secondary 
sources to gain the overall insight that Jordanova emphasizes. The function of these two 
kinds of sources is somewhat different. Secondary sources are used to provide a 
framework for understanding the situation, while the primary sources are used to show 
how the Norwegian diplomats stationed in China viewed the extraterritoriality situation 
over the period researched. All sources have been interpreted according to the contents 
they portray. The relevance and credibility of the primary sources have also been 
assessed in relation to the researched topic.   
 
 1.5 Primary Sources 
 
The largest amount of work throughout the making of this master thesis has been put 
into locating, examining, evaluating and choosing the most relevant primary sources. 
Riksarkivet, or the Norwegian National Archives, is where most primary sources have 
been found. More specifically, I have focused my research on two archives. The first is 
named: "S-2611 - Utenriksstasjonene, generalkonsulatet i Shanghai" (The foreign 
diplomatic offices, consulate general in Shanghai) and the second: "S-2610 - 
Utenriksstasjonene, Ambassaden/Legasjonen i Beijing" (The foreign diplomatic offices, 
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the embassy/legation in Beijing). These two archives contain all the correspondence that 
was sent from the two Norwegian diplomatic institutions; the Consulate General in 
Shanghai (1886-1966) covers 42 shelf meters, while the Legation in Beijing (1920-1950) 
covers 12 shelf meters. Both archives consist of copybooks, journals and registers, as 
well as case archives. Fortunately, the Norwegian National Archives have digitalized 
lists of the contents of these two archives. Thus they have made it possible to readily 
assess which parts contain material that deals with extraterritoriality.  
The correspondence forwarded from the diplomats also included several newspaper 
cuttings; hence I have also looked into some of these. These two institutions have 
provided extensive information on the questions regarding the abolishment of Norwegian 
extraterritoriality.41 While examining the large number of correspondence regarding 
extraterritoriality in China, I have found that several of the letters contain identical or 
quite similar information. While this has provided valuable insight into the subject, it has 
been necessary for this relatively short thesis, to focus on a smaller number of letters 
that are representative for the general development of the diplomats’ views on 
Norwegian extraterritoriality.  
The authors of the book: Å gripe fortida (To seize the past) (2014) eludes that the 
English intellectual historian Quentin Skinner divides the concept of meaning into three 
different categories. The first is the lexical meaning, meaning what the text implies. The 
second is the understanding the reader gains while reading the text, its relevance. And 
the third is the historical meaning of the text, which is the purpose the author of a text 
had while creating the text. Moreover, the author of the text might have a different 
objective than only spreading information, he or she might for instance wish to imply that 
something ought to be done in a certain way.42 This third point is crucial to be aware of 
when examining the diplomatic primary sources for this thesis. The objective for why the 
diplomats wrote what they did is equally or maybe even more important than the actual 
text.      
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The Senior Adviser at the Norwegian National Archives Åshild Haugsland, affirmed in a 
mail dated to September 15, 2015, that the National Archives uses no official template 
concerning referencing. She emphasized that it is only imperative to make sure that the 
sources that have been used are relocatable.43 For this reason, all the primary sources 
that have been accessed through the Norwegian National Archives will be listed in the 
footnotes in a similar way to how the Norwegian National Archives catalogues them in its 
database. Furthermore, all the diplomatic letters that have been used as primary 
sources in this study will be listed in the bibliography section at the very end of the 
thesis.   
Nasjonalbiblioteket (the Norwegian National Library) has also provided significant 
primary sources. These sources have been accessed through the Norwegian National 
Library's online archive titled: "Statsmaktene", (the Powers of the state) which is a 
digitalized collection of documents from the Norwegian government, parliament and 
courts that can be traced back as far as 1814.44 This archive has been excellent for the 
research since it contains documents that report about the issues that were addressed 
in the "Storting" (the Norwegian Parliament) and the decisions that were made there.  
In the following I will move on to presenting some important issues that must be kept in 
mind while evaluating the relevant primary sources used in this thesis.   
   
 1.5.1 Who were the Norwegian diplomats that wrote these letters? 
 
Before looking into who the most important individuals in the Norwegian diplomatic 
service in China were, I will clarify what is meant by the various diplomatic titles and 
briefly show how the Norwegian Foreign Service worked.  
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Berg highlights that the Norwegian Foreign Service established in 1905 was divided into 
three hierarchical sections having different functions.45 He states that the most important 
of the three divisions was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He states that the Ministry’s 
role was to manage all Norwegian diplomatic institutions abroad. He further notes that 
the Norwegian diplomatic institutions abroad were divided in the diplomatic legations 
and the consulates. Berg further clarifies that the legations’46 role were to represent the 
Norwegian government on state level in foreign countries, while the consulates 
represented Norway locally towards the provincial or regional foreign authorities.47  
In 1919 the Norwegian government decided to form a Norwegian legation to represent 
Norway in Beijing.48 Johan Michelet (1877-1964) was appointed the first Norwegian 
Minister (known in Norwegian as: “Sendemann”, meaning the leader of a diplomatic 
station)49 to the legation in Beijing, while Nicolai Aall (1883-1975) acquired the position 
as Norway’s Consul General in Shanghai, the most significant port city of China.50 
However, the establishment of the independent Norwegian diplomatic representation 
happened during a turbulent time in Chinese history. Stein Seeberg and Gunnar Filseth 
highlight that Nicolai Aall brought up this issue in one of his letters.51 Aall had according 
to Seeberg and Filseth, stated that because of the turmoil in China at the time and the 
rather limited power of the government in Beijing, the General-Consulate in Shanghai 
had to do nearly all the negotiations with various Chinese authorities. Because of this 
Aall claimed that the Norwegian legation in Beijing at times had nearly nothing to do. It is 
certainly possible that Aall could have overstated his own position in China, but as 
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history shows that Beijing had limited power at time, it is not an unreasonable claim. 
Furthermore, since Nicolai Aall is the diplomat who has written most of the letters that I 
have used as primary sources, I have chosen to elaborate on who he was.  
I have found information about Nicolai Aall in a biographical work titled: Men of Shanghai 
and North China (1933).52 After studying at the University of Oslo and serving in the 
Norwegian Army, Aall worked as an assistant judge as well as secretary at the Foreign 
Office in Oslo. He was stationed in the Norwegian diplomatic service both in London and 
New York, before he arrived in China. Here he was the Norwegian Consul General in 
Shanghai until 1928 when he became the Norwegian “Chargé d’affairs” (the individual 
who leads a diplomatic legation when for instance the position of Minister was vacant).53 
Seeberg and Filseth explain that Aall acquired this position because Minister Michelet 
was reappointed to Rio de Janeiro in 1928.54 The book: Men of Shanghai and North 
China also clarifies that Aall held this diplomatic title until he returned to Shanghai in 
1931 as both the Norwegian “Chargé d’affairs” and Consul General.55 Aall also justified 
the use of extraterritoriality in an article he wrote to the Nordic journal of International 
Law in 1957. He stressed in this article that extraterritoriality offered foreigners in China 
real protection, unlike to the Chinese laws, and that the system therefore had been an 
absolute necessity.56 
Another noteworthy individual was Thorgeir Siqveland (1892-1968) who acquired the 
position as Norwegian Vice-Consul in Shanghai in 1923, and even was the functioning 
Consul General in 1925 and in 1927.57 I have also used some letters sent by Kaare 
Ingstad (1901-1999) who served as an attaché (the lowest rank of the regular 
diplomats)58 in the Norwegian legation from 1927-1933.59 Ludvig Aubert (1878–1964) 
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was another Norwegian diplomat who worked as the Norwegian Minister to China, 
Japan and Thailand from 1929 to 1935.60 Nicolai Aall was however, relocated to Rio de 
Janeiro in 1938, and it was therefore Terje Knudtzon (1886-1966) who led the two 
Norwegian institutions as the Norwegian minister in Shanghai during the final years of 
Norwegian extraterritoriality (1938-1943).61 Knudtzon successor was Alf Hassel (1880-
1956) who led the Norwegian legation in China's wartime capital Chongqing from 1943 
to 1945.62 However, Nicolai Aall returned to China in 1945, and once again led the two 
Norwegian diplomatic institutions, until he retired in 1952.63  
 
 1.5.2 Diplomatic Correspondence as Primary Sources  
 
Diplomatic letters as a specific source-genre raise some issues. As Skinner pointed to, 
what the writer means by what he or she says in a text is not necessarily the most 
important aspect of the text, the writer might want to portray how something ought to 
be.64 The Norwegian diplomatic letters portray the position held by both the diplomats 
and the majority of foreigners in China. The letters implicitly show a bias towards the 
foreign view on extraterritoriality and the diplomats even in some letters admit that they 
feel incapable of evaluating the practice of extraterritoriality in China objectively because 
of their prejudice against the Chinese judicial system. However, since the main research 
question in this thesis is: how and why Norway abolished its extraterritoriality in China, 
the diplomats’ lack of objectivity is not a problem. This is because this thesis researches 
the reasons that made Norway abolish its extraterritoriality in China and therefore the 
diplomats’ views are of great importance.  
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Nevertheless, the most important thing when examining primary sources is firstly to 
attempt to evaluate their reliability, validity and representatively.65 Political sources are 
often problematized by their will to tell the truth.66 In this respect diplomatic letters must 
be evaluated on the same basis. It is likely that the diplomats presented information and 
statistics that they considered correct. The genre “diplomatic letters” suggests that the 
authors tried to make their reports as accurate as possible since it was their job to do so 
on matters that needed Norway's diplomatic attention. However, since the diplomats 
were stakeholders who benefitted from extraterritorial privileges themselves, it is likely 
that this had some influence on their views on the matter. Furthermore, the diplomats 
likely would not take unnecessary risks by providing misinformation in their letters, since 
that at worst could make them lose their position and legitimacy if any attempt at 
deception was discovered. However, it is quite possible that the diplomats could have 
been selective by presenting information that supported their views while leaving out 
information that opposed it. The letters are generally written in close proximity in time to 
the events they describe, something that strengthen the sources’ reliability. 
Evaluating the closeness of the source to the issue it describes, can sometimes be 
complicated. This is relevant when examining diplomatic letters, because the authors on 
the one hand were close to the events that they described since residing in China, but 
on the other hand most foreigners lived in relative self-contained communities there.67 
Thus one can argue that the foreigners at the same time were relatively “close”, but also 
“distant” to the events they highlighted in their correspondence.  
The letters used as primary sources are primarily written by various Norwegian 
diplomats stationed in China. Most are either sent from the Norwegian Legation in 
Beijing or the Norwegian Consulate-General in Shanghai. The remaining sources are 
correspondence that was mostly sent from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
addressed to either of the two Norwegian institutions in China. Many of the letters were 
not signed, hence we cannot know for certain who the authors of these letters were. I 
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will only claim that a specific individual wrote a letter when that specific individual also 
signed it.  
 
 1.5.3 Newspapers as Primary Sources 
 
Newspaper cuttings that were forwarded as part of the diplomatic correspondence have 
also been used as sources. Newspaper articles as primary sources must always be 
assessed on the basis of several issues. Newspapers have historically been 
mouthpieces for the elite. They have also mirrored the social attitudes and ideologies of 
the time in which they were written. Many newspapers have been closely connected to a 
political ideology which has had some bearing on their articles. They have also been 
dependent on both getting advertisements and selling copies.   
The newspaper cuttings found in the Norwegian archives forwarded by the Norwegian 
diplomats were mostly from the North China Daily News. This paper advertised itself 
with the slogan: "impartial, not neutral". I interpret this slogan to mean that the 
newspaper sought to cover issues based on objectivity, but that it did not restrain itself 
from taking sides. One must keep this favoritism in mind when evaluating the newspaper 
articles as primary sources. The Western newspapers in China were like the Norwegian 
diplomats, both relatively “close”, but at the same time "distant" to the events that they 
described. Hence the information in these articles may be somewhat inaccurate, partial 
and/or misinformed and thereby describe events differently than what can be found in 
Chinese primary sources. 
The newspaper cuttings are highlighted in this section because they are written by other 
individuals than the Norwegian diplomats who forwarded the cuttings in their letters. This 
fact is important when evaluating the said newspaper cuttings. Firstly, it is important to 
ask why the Norwegian diplomats decided to forward exactly these newspaper cuttings. 
They could possibly have their own ulterior motives for doing so since the narrative in 
these articles supported their own views on extraterritoriality.  
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One must also be aware that the English language newspapers printed in China at the 
time tended to favor the British or Western position.68 The English language newspapers 
located in China were primarily aimed at a Western audience and thereby positioned 
themselves accordingly. This meant that these newspapers argued for keeping 
extraterritoriality in China for as long as the treaty power states deemed it necessary. 
This material includes letters to the editor written by foreigners who lived in China at the 
time and wanted to express their own views on extraterritoriality. The English language 




 1.5.4 Unused Sources 
 
The Norwegian historian Eirik Brazier told me in a mail from January 26. 2015, that he 
had briefly worked on Nicolai Aall's private archive located in the Norwegian National 
Library.69 Though Nicolai Aall was one of the major individuals within the Norwegian 
diplomatic service in China at the time, the focus of this study is not on his life as a 
private person. When writing a master thesis, although access to new source material is 
interesting, the scope of the study must be confined to the most relevant material 
available, in this case the diplomatic sources. Thus after careful consideration, Aall’s 
private archive is left out mainly for two reasons; firstly, it is rather doubtful whether the 
source material would provide additional information on this subject which the diplomatic 
sources do not reveal, and secondly, investigating the archive would be another vast 
project to undertake. However, if someone in the future wants to write Nicolai Aall's 
biography, this archive will surely provide them with excellent sources into his personal 
life.  
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 1.6 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, whereof three are analytical chapters 
dedicated to different topics with different sub-research questions. In this opening 
chapter I have presented and defined extraterritoriality, the topic of my research, as well 
as the selected literature and the methodological ways for dealing with the primary 
sources. Chapter two will look into five historical contexts that are significant for 
understanding Norwegian extraterritoriality in China. The third chapter is my first 
analytical chapter. In this chapter I explore how the Norwegian diplomats reacted to how 
the Washington Naval Conference (a conference between the United States, Japan, 
China, France, Britain, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Portugal in 1921-1922) had 
agreed to assemble a commission that should look into the practice of extraterritoriality 
in China. I continue this investigation in the fourth chapter where I examine the reasons 
that made Norway participate in the investigation of the issues concerning 
extraterritoriality. The fifth chapter explores how the Nationalist Chinese government 
campaigned against extraterritoriality after the Nationalists had seized power. It also 
explores how this campaign succeeded in making new agreements with Norway that 
ultimately ended in the abolishment of Norwegian extraterritoriality. The sixth chapter is 
a brief historical epilogue that outlines the period after the new Sino-Norwegian 
agreements onwards until the abolishment of foreign extraterritoriality in China. The 
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Chapter II  





This chapter will look into five contexts that all are significant for understanding 
Norwegian extraterritoriality as a historic phenomenon. The first context is the “most 
favored nation agreement” which permitted nations like Sweden-Norway to gain similar 
advantages in China as powers such as Britain. The second context is Norway’s 
neutrality policy that was practiced after the independence from Sweden in 1905. The 
third context is the Qing dynasty’s early encounter with the “International Society” and 
how this encounter affected the continuance of Sino-foreign relations. The fourth context 
is the political turmoil in China that happened after the fall of the Qing dynasty. The fifth 
and final context is the outcome of the Washington Naval Conference, since the 
attending treaty powers there among other things agreed to evaluate the practice of 
extraterritoriality in China.    
 
2.2 The Most Favored Nation Agreement 
 
Out of all the foreign states that sought to establish treaties with China after the outcome 
of the First Opium War, the most surprising newcomer was possibly the Swedish-
Norwegian union. Cassel explains that the reason for why minor powers such as 
Sweden-Norway were able to form advantageous treaties with China, was because of 
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the Qing dynasty’s policy of granting all foreign states the same rights.70 Wang 
emphasizes that the Sino-British Treaty of Nanjing (1842) that followed the First Opium 
War contained an extraordinary detail known as the “most favored nation clause”. She 
clarifies that this clause could trace its origin from seventieth-century European 
diplomacy that guaranteed equal trading rights and opportunities between nations. 
However, she also emphasizes that a significant deviation was made in the Treaty of 
Nanjing, which was the loss of reciprocal rights. The terms of this treaty affirmed that if 
the Qing dynasty extended the commercial rights of a foreign country, it was also 
obliged to grant the same concessions to all the other treaty powers without obtaining 
any reciprocal concessions.71 Cassel underlines that the possible explanation for why 
the Qing emperor agreed to this rather unreasonable clause, was because he wanted to 
portray that he still had absolute control over the situation. In other words, the emperor 
wanted to make it appear like the reason for why he concurred to this was because of 
his own generosity.72 Nevertheless, this remarkable clause opened the possibility for 
smaller nations such as Sweden-Norway, to gain equal advantages as the ones that had 
already been granted to the British Empire through the making of similar treaties with 
China.73 Cassel underlines how Sweden-Norway in fact became the fourth treaty power 
(after Britain, the United States and France) that obtained an “unequal treaty” with the 
Qing dynasty.74 Cassel states that Sweden-Norway attained its treaty with the Qing 
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 2.3 The Norwegian Neutrality Policy  
 
Since this is a study of why Norway abolished its extraterritoriality, it is evidently vital to 
have an understanding of the development of Norwegian foreign policy during the period 
that is being researched.  
Berg categorizes Norway’s foreign policy after its independence from Sweden in 1905 
until 1920 as a “consolidating policy”. He further describes this as a set of defensive 
lines that should protect Norway from the grim international politics at the time. He also 
stresses that there was always one underlying condition that determined Norway’s 
foreign policy, and that was to establish strong diplomatic ties to Great Britain.76 He 
further brings up how the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jørgen Løvland, (1848-1922) 
established the framework for the newly independent Norway’s foreign policy in one of 
his speeches in 1905. Berg highlights that this policy was described as Norway’s 
“neutrality policy”. He continues by affirming that the goal was both to protect Norway 
from being involved in any conflict between the great powers, as well as to preserve 
Norway’s commercial interests abroad. Berg further underlines that these two guidelines 
would become Norway’s primary foreign policy for the next two decades.77  
Riste claims that these political guidelines were comparable to the ones presented by 
Thomas Jefferson for the young American republic in the late 18th century.78 According 
to Berg, Norway tried to establish three sets of “defense lines” that should protect 
Norway’s political integrity. The first one was the Norwegian military, which should 
defend Norway from foreign aggressors. The second was the safety provided by 
international law, which Norway tried to strengthen, to further protect itself from potential 
foreign aggressors. The final one was the establishment of a Norwegian royal family with 
ties to both Denmark and Britain.79 Riste stresses that the reasoning behind this 
decision was to ensure that the British Navy would protect Norway from aggressors.80 
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Berg adds that it was not the Norwegian military, but rather international law that the 
Norwegian politicians believed could shield Norway from potential conflicts.81 He further 
accentuates how the Norwegian politicians believed that it was the duty of smaller 
nations to improve international law, since these nations were the ones that mostly 
desired agreements based on reason, rather than on military strength.82 Riste also 
points to the main challenges the newly independent Norway faced. Norway’s primary 
challenge according to Riste was “the divorce settlement” with Sweden. Yet he also 
underlines how important it was for Norway to be recognized by the great powers.83 
Berg highlights that Norway’s two main focuses regarding international law were to 
stress the need for negotiations between states having various disputes to avoid conflict, 
and also to strengthen neutral states’ trading rights during wars. In other words: neutral 
nations should be able to carry on their trade, even though their trading partners were at 
war with one another.84  
However, Riste argues that in spite of Norway being a neutral state during the First 
World War, the Norwegian economic dependence on Great Britain in fact turned the 
country into Britain’s “neutral ally”.85 Berg stresses that Norway’s “neutrality policy” was 
still relevant during the aftermath of the First World War. He continues by affirming that 
the post war negotiations in Versailles became a forum where Norway demonstrated the 
continuance of its neutrality policy, including voicing its support for the “Open Door 
Policy” that emphasized the importance of an open free trade in China.86 
Riste affirms that Norway joined the League of Nations, albeit somewhat reluctantly in 
1920, yet he adds that it might be claimed that Norway was still eager to continue its 
policy of neutrality rather than putting all of its eggs into that one basket.87 
Even so, major Norwegian political figures, like the Norwegian Prime Minister for three 
different terms in the interwar period, Johan Ludwig Mowinckel, (1870-1943) advocated 
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a “new internationalism”, that even further laid its emphasis on strengthening 
international law.88 This came as a supplement to Norway’s traditional “neutrality policy”, 
and thus Riste stresses that it marks a second formative period in the evolution of 
Norway’s foreign policy doctrine.89   
International politics, however, showed a marked rise in conflicts during the 1930s in the 
aftermath of the world economic crisis in 1929. As the danger of war became steadily 
more marked, Norway retreated from its League of Nations’ obligations to carry out 
sanctions against aggressor-states.90 On May 31, 1938, the Norwegian parliament 
declared “its right to observe a complete and unconditional neutrality in any war which it 
does not itself approve as an action of the League of Nations.”91 This signalized a slight 
shift from the “new internationalism”, yet Norwegian delegates to the League of Nations 
continued their verbal appeals to the great powers to act to settle international disputes 
by peaceful means. Riste continues by emphasizing that Norway had by 1938 fully 
returned to its neutralism.92   
Riste points to that even though the Norwegian sentiment was that it was unlikely that 
the country would be attacked neither for the strategic value of the Norwegian territory, 
nor for the value of Norwegian natural resources, this proved wrong. Germany attacked 
Norway on the 9th of April 1940. Southern Norway was quickly seized by German forces, 
but the fighting in Northern Norway was somewhat more prolonged. Yet the Norwegian 
King and government managed to escape to Britain on the 7th of June 1940, where they 
carried on as the legitimate government of a nation at war with Germany.93  
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2.4 The Qing dynasty’s encounter with International Society 
 
Another significant context to be aware of while researching Norwegian extraterritoriality, 
is China’s encounters with “International Society”. Several political scientists have 
highlighted this issue while studying China’s integration into international society. 
Therefore this issue will also be brought to light as one of the contexts that are of 
importance for this research.     
Suzuki accentuates how the Qing dynasty perceived issues that were presented to them 
from what he describes as the “Janus-faced European International Society”.94 He 
highlights that Westerners wanted China and Japan to understand that they needed to 
westernize in order to be considered “civilized” by the Western states.95 Kayaoğlu 
underlines that the Western jurists however, had legitimized Western imperialism by 
excluding all non-Western states from their definition of sovereignty.96 Therefore the two 
East-Asian states had potentially much to gain if they managed to be perceived by the 
Western states as civilized entities.  
Suzuki emphasizes that the Chinese showed little understanding towards how 
international society presented “war” as a sometimes “necessary evil” to enforce 
interventional justice. He further underlines that international society’s concept of 
“balance of power” gradually grew on the Chinese. He accentuates that China began to 
understand and appreciate how this concept was designed to secure coexistence 
among the societies’ members, and how this concept benefitted smaller states.97 He 
also claims that the Chinese elites acquired an understanding of how international law 
emphasized that all sovereign states in the world had equal rights. He further argues 
that understanding this even permitted them to score some diplomatic victories in their 
disputes with Western states.98 Suzuki also mentions how the major foreign powers 
wanted China to adopt a European styled diplomacy. He further claims that the Western 
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states disagreed with how the Qing delegated international matters into the hands of its 
local authorities, something that prevented diplomatic contact with them. Suzuki 
accentuates that this resulted in that the West considered the Qing government to be 
incapable of containing anti-foreign riots and protecting Western life and property within 
China.99 However, the days of the Qing dynasty in power were about to end; and the 
dynasty would soon be replaced by a flawed republic, a transformation that would 
drastically alter the political landscape within China for good. 
 
 2.5 The Political Situation in China after the fall of the Qing 
 
The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 that overthrew the Qing dynasty signaled a dramatic 
change for China’s future course. The revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Qing, 
but more importantly, it ended the long lasting chain of dynasties that had ruled China 
throughout history. Westad highlights that the Qing Empire was replaced by a 
succession of weak central governments which slowly ceased exercising full authority in 
most matters outside a section of northern China around the capital Beijing.100 
Suzuki underlines that there is not much evidence demonstrating any serious attempt by 
the Qing dynasty to alter the Chinese state and its institution to be based upon 
European models.101 He further highlights that the Qing ultimately failed to implement 
the political reforms needed to centralize China along Western lines.102 Mackerras 
accentuates that the Qing had became stuck in a vicious circle. If they refused to accept 
the foreign powers’ demands they risked to lose their international support, something 
that the Qing was in dire need of. However, if they did not resist the imperialists then the 
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Qing risked losing the loyalty of their own subjects.103 However, it proved to be their loss 
of support from the military that became their bane.   
After the former Qing general Yuan Shikai (1859-1912) for his own personal gain, seized 
power over the revolution from the revolutionary visionary Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), 
Sun Yat-sen left Beijing for southern China. There he set up a counter-regime, the 
Nationalist Party (also known as the Kuomintang or the Chinese Nationalists) in 
Guangzhou in 1917. Even though Sun encountered many difficulties and died before he 
had achieved his ambitions, he had still managed to develop the Chinese Nationalist 
Party. In doing so he had among other things established his well-known "three 
principles of the people".104 Sun Yat-sen’s new government also laid the foundation for 
the success of his protégé, Chiang Kai-Shek’s "Northern Campaign" which reunited 
China under the Nationalist Party’s rule in 1928.105  
 
 2.5.1 The Era of the Warlords 
 
The most significant aspect about the Chinese warlords in the context of this study, was 
their constant power struggle and looting. The atrocities committed by the Chinese 
warlords and their soldiers provided fuel to the foreigners’ arguments about how China 
was not prepared to become a republic, as well as how it was not able to look after itself 
nor its people. Even though the Chinese warlords’ misdeeds were often stressed in the 
foreigners’ critique of China; it is for the purpose of this thesis, only imperative to know 
that there were many warlord cliques, and that their internal wars destabilized China 
severely. 
Mackerras defines a Chinese warlord as a military officer who commanded a personal 
army that was in control of an area, and who acted more or less independently of the 
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Chinese government at the time.106 The Chinese Republic was divided among 
numerous warlords and their military cliques during the infamous “Warlord Era”. These 
military cliques also frequently engaged in armed conflicts over territories with rivaling 
warlords. However, in spite of their difference the warlords agreed on one thing, and that 
was that there could only be one national government in China.107 All warlords desired to 
reunite the country under their own rule. Hence, there was always a power struggle to 
gain full control over the government in Beijing. Westad stresses that throughout the 
Warlord Era and in spite of all the domestic and foreign challenges, China as a state still 
managed to keep in place a semblance of central government with a mandate to carry 
out foreign policy.108 The government in Beijing also enjoyed international recognition 
and was thus considered to be the legitimate government of China by the foreign states. 
The main benefit of having a government representing China as a whole, was that it 
made it much harder for foreign governments to seize provinces and claim them as their 
own. Westad also emphasizes that no foreign power, not even Japan, had any intention 
of a complete breakup of China at the time.109 
One of the reasons for why China’s territories were divided between Chinese warlords, 
is explained by Macarras by the late military reforms composed by the Qing Empire. 
Rather than having a national army, the Qing decided to utilize regional forces and 
militias. This led allegedly to the soldiers being more loyal to their superiors than to the 
central government. This decentralization of the military in addition to the ideological 
vacuum after the fall of the Qing, were the main reasons for why the generals were able 
to take absolute control over their armies.110 
The most powerful and modern of the Qing’s armed forces was the northern based 
Beiyang army led by general Yuan Shikai. The republican visionary and leader of the 
Xinhai Revolution, Sun Yat-sen, needed the support of Yuan Shikai to be able to fulfill 
his revolutionary ambitions to overthrow the Qing in favor of a republic. Thus Sun Yat-
sen had no choice rather than to guarantee Yuan Shikai the presidency of the Chinese 
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Republic if he in return backed the revolution.111 Yuan Shikai decided to give his 
support, but at the same time to manipulate the situation for his own personal gain. Yuan 
Shikai had no intention of allowing constitutional processes to flourish and immediately 
began to seize full power for himself. He also attempted to crown himself emperor in 
1915, something which caused a storm of protests and several Chinese regions 
declared their independence. Yuan Shikai died the following year, a death that initiated 
the infamous Warlord Era. The causes of the revolution are very compound and require 
much more depth than what I can offer in this brief summary. However, a very important 
reason is the humiliation many Chinese felt that the Westerners had imposed on China 
through the unequal treaties. This was a problem that the Qing had proved incapable of 
dealing with.112 
 
2.6 The Washington Naval Conference and Its Outcome 
 
The turbulent times following the end of the First World War displayed that Japan rather 
than China had become the leading East-Asian power. The United States continued its 
China-policy, known as the “Open Door Policy”, which called for an international 
agreement preventing an expensive naval race developing in East Asia, as well as 
protecting American interests in East Asia and the Pacific.113 It was vital for the United 
States to avoid being pushed out of China by the other treaty powers. Westad 
accentuates that Japan's power and influence had increasingly grown in the region and 
had led to rivalry between Japan and the United States.114 Hence the Open Door Policy 
also emphasized that China should be kept open for trade on an equal basis for all 
nations.115 The United States arranged the Washington Naval Conference from 1921 to 
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1922. The goal of the conference was to limit the naval arms race in Asia and to 
determine the status of China.116  
This conference resulted in the powers agreeing on several treaties, among which was 
the Eight-Power Resolution (officially known as: Extraterritoriality and Administration of 
Justice in China).117 The Eight-Power Resolution agreed on assembling a commission 
(known as the Commission on Extraterritoriality) to look into the legal jurisdiction 
practiced in China, and to investigate if China was ready to have foreign extraterritoriality 
abolished.118 This treaty initiated the first move towards genuinely addressing the issues 
that surrounded foreign extraterritoriality in China. Even though similar promises had 
been given China earlier, for instance the vague pledge from the British Empire in the 
Mackay Treaty of 1902 to abolish extraterritoriality if China westernized its legal 
system;119 none had been as specific as this treaty.120 This makes the Eight-Power 
Resolution highly relevant for my research, not only because it addressed the state of 
extraterritoriality in China, but even more so since Norway at a later stage decided to 
adhere to it. I will address the Eight-Power Resolution in more detail after clarifying the 
historical context that was relevant to its making. 
Japan´s rise to power and its increasing influence over China had triggered the “May 
Fourth Movement” of 1919. The movement started out as a protest-march organized by 
Chinese students to demonstrate against the treaty powers. This event also sparked 
student rallies in other significant Chinese cities such as Shanghai. The primary reason 
provoking the movement was the treaty following the aftermath of the First World War. 
This treaty accepted Japan’s demand that all former German interests in China should 
be transferred to them. China had assumed being rewarded for having joined the allied 
countries in the war by having some foreign privileges reverted.121 The demands of the 
protesters were mainly to dismiss the pro-Japanese leadership; and the government 
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decided to comply with their demands.122 The protests persuaded the Chinese 
government to refusing to sign the Treaty of Versailles. Protests in China however, did 
not alter the decision of granting Japan the previous German holdings in China.123 
Westad states that the major foreign powers by this clearly demonstrated how they 
believed that the principles of self-determination glorified during the First World War, 
were not applicable for the Chinese or other Non-Europeans, except for the already 
westernized Japanese.124 
Another event sparkling anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese sentiments in China, was the 
“twenty one demands” that Japan pressed upon China in 1915. These demands 
increased Japan’s control over Manchuria and over the Chinese economy. In doing so 
Japan violated the Open Door Policy. But the United States and Japan came to an 
agreement in 1917 in which the United States acknowledged Japan's special interest 
over Manchuria, known as the “Lansing-Ishi agreement”.125 The Washington Conference 
was a continuation of this initiative. Summarized, the treaties made at the Washington 
Conference were: “the Four-Power Treaty” (to reaffirmation of the status quo regarding 
the Pacific Islands), 126 “the Five-Power Treaty” (an arms control treaty that dealt with the 
naval arms race)127 and “the Nine-Power Treaty” (a reaffirmation of the Open Door 
Policy).128,129 However, it is the Eight-Power Resolution that is of most significance for 
this thesis since it dealt with extraterritoriality in China. 
The Eight-Power Resolution was signed on the 10th of December 1921 during the 
Washington Conference. This resolution addressed the status of foreign extraterritoriality 
in China. The treaty powers were Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal; while the 
remaining participants were the countries that also addressed the balance of power in 
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East-Asia. These states were Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy. 
The Resolution stated that the Signatory States had concluded to establish a 
Commission to which every government should appoint one member, to inquire into the 
practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China.130 The treaty also declared that the 
nonparticipating treaty powers that practiced extraterritorial rights in China, could accede 
to the resolution by notifying the government of the United States about their adherence 
to the said treaty.131 The newly established inquiry of foreign extraterritoriality caused 
some worried reactions within the foreign communities in China.  
Another important circumstance surrounding the Washington Conference was how 
Chinese students who had been educated at Western Universities, had started to 
question the powers' justification of their practice of extraterritoriality in China. Mackerras 
highlights that the new Chinese intellectuals being part of the May Fourth Movement, 
brought forward modern and progressive trends of knowledge to the country.132 
Kayaoğlu shows how the first Chinese attempt to westernize its legal system occurred in 
1904 through the establishment of the Law Codification Commission. This attempt was 
motivated by the British and American declarations that linked the abolition of 
extraterritoriality to the Chinese institutionalization of state legislation.133 He also reveals 
how the Chinese in 1911 drafted a Civil Code based upon the Japanese Code; however, 
this code was never promulgated due to a strong conservative opposition from the 
Chinese elite.134  
Nevertheless, we will see in the upcoming chapter how these attempts of reform were 
used by the Chinese to push for the abolishment of extraterritoriality as well as how the 
treaty powers responded to this attempt. Since the focus of this thesis is to look into how 
and why Norway abolished its extraterritoriality in China, the main focus will be on the 
Norwegian response.  
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Chapter III  
Responses to the Washington Naval 
Conference 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
 
The First World War and its aftermath were to change foreign policies towards China. 
The Washington Naval Conference was initiated exactly with the purpose of setting out a 
new policy dealing with security issues in Asia, and to determine China’s new “status” in 
particular. China was changing too. As an emerging modern nation state with features 
and characteristics that was reminiscent to the treaty powers, China was 
interchangeably a player to be reckoned with on the international diplomatic scene. This 
chapter addresses how Norway responded to the Washington Naval Conference though 
its diplomatic channel. More precisely how the Norwegian diplomats in China argued for 
making Norway continue to support extraterritoriality because the Eight-Power 
Resolution had declared to investigate the system’s practice. This adheres to the 
research question highlighted in chapter one since this debate is a vital part of the 
development that ultimately ended Norwegian extraterritoriality in China.  
The aim of this chapter is thereby to examine how the responses sent by the Norwegian 
diplomats in China to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo reflected their views on the 
continuance of extraterritoriality. Extraterritoriality was something that all Norwegians in 
China benefitted from. Consequently I have decided to investigate the following sub-
questions in this chapter: 1) how and why did the Norwegian diplomats respond to 
the Eight-Power Resolution? And: 2) how and why did the Norwegian diplomats 
attempt to influence their superiors in Norway to share their opinions on the 
continuing practice of extraterritoriality in China?  
His 350 Jens Tepstad 40 
 
In order to answer these questions properly I will first briefly address the different views 
on extraterritoriality, before exploring the contents of the Norwegian diplomats' letters. 
 
3.2  Different views on Extraterritoriality in China  
 
Kayaoğlu argues that during the time of the Washington Conference the Chinese 
government had enacted multiple reforms to the Chinese Legal Code as an attempt to 
both please and persuade the treaty powers to voluntarily abolish their 
extraterritoriality.135 This attempt set in motion a series of intense debates among 
foreigners and Chinese alike on whether or not China was ready to be integrated into 
International Society. Some of the foreigners in China argued that China did not act in 
accordance with their new westernized and unbiased legal system and thus China was 
incapable of putting its new modified laws into practice.136 Furthermore, according to 
Westad, the Beiyang government (the central Chinese government) during the early 
1920s did in reality only exercise its authority over a region in close proximity to the 
capital Beijing.137 This limited regional power was something frequently mentioned in the 
foreigners’ critique of the Chinese government at the time. 
Kayaoğlu points to that China applied two different strategies for ending 
extraterritoriality. He explains that the original Chinese approach to end this system was 
to challenge it on normative terms. In coherence with this strategy the Chinese had 
attempted to demonstrate the system's inefficiency and inability to be non-partial. These 
complaints did not however, end extraterritoriality; instead it encouraged the Westerners 
to reform the existing system.138 The Chinese strategy then shifted to attempting to 
westernize its legal institutions, as several Western countries had stated the possibility 
of abolishing the system if and when they saw an improvement in the Chinese judicial 
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administration.139 Britain had already during the opening years of the 20th century 
promised to abolish extraterritoriality in China.140 The condition for doing so was that 
China established proper judicial institutions that protected the legal and property rights 
of British citizens.141 
Kayaoğlu clarifies that the Western terms were also acknowledged by China since they 
did try to westernize their legal institutions on several occasions.142 Kayaoğlu also 
reveals how Japan also had been subjected to extraterritoriality; but that the Japanese 
had managed to get it abolished through several Western inspired reforms.143 Therefore, 
Japan had proved that it was possible for an Asian country to get rid of extraterritoriality 
through the implementation of requested reforms. Suzuki highlights that China in reality 
had no choice but to comply with such conditions.144 Therefore all parties recognized the 
premise for the abolition of extraterritoriality. In other words all had a mutual 
understanding: If China fully practiced a just westernized legal system, only then would 
extraterritoriality be removed. The Eight-Power Resolution signed during the Washington 
Conference specifically addressed the status of foreign extraterritoriality in China. In 
doing so the signatory states decided to establish a commission which would inquire into 
the practices of extraterritoriality in China.   
 
3.3  The Norwegian Diplomats’ Responses to the Resolution 
 
This section will investigate how the Norwegian diplomats in China portrayed the debate 
that occurred there because of the Eight-Power Resolution, and examine the arguments 
they put forward to their superiors back in Norway. The general debate had been 
triggered because the Eight-Power Resolution had declared an intent to investigate 
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extraterritoriality, something that might result in the abolishment of the practice. This 
worst case scenario sparked a debate where foreigners living in China expressed their 
worry if this investigation should result in the abolishment of extraterritoriality.   
It is crucial to keep in mind when analyzing the primary sources used, that most 
foreigners, including the Norwegians, either went to China for economic or religious 
reasons. Extraterritoriality was important for all foreigners since it offered protection to 
their businesses as well as to their religious practices. Many of the foreigners who 
sought their fortunes in China were working for foreign-administered institutions such as 
the Imperial Maritime Customs Service,145 while others lived there as missionaries. In 
fact, a letter written on the 29th of April 1926 by a Norwegian diplomat in Shanghai 
declares that more than half of the Norwegians residing in China during the mid-1920s 
were working for some Christian mission.146 However, the same letter also states that 
most missionaries, as well as the other Norwegians residing outside Shanghai, rarely 
took advantage of extraterritoriality.147 This suggests that it was the Norwegians in 
Shanghai who were the most worried by the possible removal of their extraterritorial 
rights. Therefore it is not surprising that it was the foreign residents of Shanghai, 
including the Norwegian diplomats working there, who were the most vocal for keeping 
the status quo regarding foreign extraterritoriality. I will look into how and why the 
Norwegian diplomats expressed their views on extraterritoriality in regard to the safety of 
the foreigners in China. Another detail to keep in mind is that out of all Norwegians in 
China, it was the diplomats who were best suited to influence Norway’s actions on 
everyone’s behalf. Their letters to Oslo reveal their attempts and arguments to persuade 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to become more sympathetic towards the 
perseverance of foreign extraterritoriality.  
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3.3.1 “The Standard of Civilization” 
  
Gong introduces a term in his book: The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society 
which he calls “the standard of civilization”. According to Gong this term underlines the 
five requirements that the major foreign powers demanded from non-Western states in 
order to consider them parties of the “civilized” world. Summarized, these five 
requirements are:  
1) A guarantee of basic rights for Westerners residing in the country.  
2) An efficient bureaucracy capable of defending the country.  
3) Adherence to international law and an effective legal system.  
4) The maintenance of diplomatic relations. 
5) The compliance with the new Western norms that prohibited “uncivilized 
practices” (examples that Gong mentions are slavery and polygamy).148 
 
However, Gong’s definition has been criticized by other academics. Kayaoğlu stresses 
that the requirements that Gong lists are all bound by his subjective values. This makes 
it rather difficult to measure to what extent Gong’s requirements were actually met when 
extraterritoriality was abolished in China. He continues this argument by stating that 
even if a non-Western country had fulfilled the requirements that Gong lists, it could still 
be perceived by the West as being uncivilized. In other words, he suggests that a better 
approach to explain the reason for why extraterritoriality was abolished, is to examine if 
the West perceived China to have fulfilled the necessary requirements.149 I found it 
interesting that Kayaoğlu stresses this notion. This is because many of the sources I’ve 
examined emphasize that China had only reformed its judicial system on paper, not in 
practice.       
Suzuki also highlights some problems with the view presented by Gong in his book: 
Civilization and Empire. He pinpoints that it is fairly problematic to blindly presume that 
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the industrialized Western states were the most advanced in all aspects. According to 
Suzuki, to suppose that a Chinese westernization will involve an entire duplication of all 
the political, economic and social institutions of the Western societies at the time, has its 
shortcomings.150 
The critique against Gong’s five requirements highlights some important issues. It is 
important to recognize that the Western way of institutionalizing its bureaucracy not 
automatically is the most efficient. Even so, Gong’s five requirements is a reasonable 
way to classify the various necessities that were required of China by the foreign 
powers. The aim of this thesis is investigating Norway's role and involvement in process 
that ultimately ended in the abolishment of extraterritoriality in China. For this purpose 
making use of Gong’s requirements to classify the arguments found in the primary 
sources, is fruitful. I have noticed that the arguments that the Norwegian diplomats made 
for keeping extraterritoriality unchanged, fit well together with the five necessities that 
Gong argues were required of China.151  
 
3.3.2 The Response from the Norwegian diplomats   
 
The correspondence sent from the Norwegian diplomats in Beijing and Shanghai is 
voluminous. Examining the bulk of these letters I have noticed that many arguments are 
repeated. This can be explained because the recipients of these letters were many; 
hence the contents of the letters were of a similar nature. While working though this 
extensive source material, two long letters have stood out. These two lengthy letters 
contain most of the arguments found in the entire bulk of correspondence. Thus these 
are excellent source material to provide the necessary foundation for establishing the 
required understanding of the arguments that the diplomats portrayed. These two letters 
will be briefly introduced before exploring their contents. Further on, the narrative of the 
letters will be explored, and how they depicted the views of the Norwegian diplomats on 
extraterritoriality will also be looked into.  
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The first letter is written on the 6th of April 1921 in Shanghai, addressed to Erik Andreas 
Colban.152 Colban153 was a Norwegian diplomat who in 1919 had started his service 
within the newly established League of Nations.154 This letter is unsigned and therefore I 
cannot know for sure who wrote it. However, it is likely that Nicolai Aall had at least 
vouched for this letter since it was sent from the Consulate-General in Shanghai, the 
institution he was in charge of. The contents of the letter suggest that the author’s intent 
was to influence Colban into both understanding and supporting the author's views. This 
intent is made clear by the author himself since he emphasizes that because the League 
of Nations is going to bring up the question of extraterritoriality, he has decided to write a 
letter to Colban. Since Colban was an influential Norwegian diplomat at the time, it was 
important for the individual who wrote this letter to make Colban understand his 
concerns. The author also forwarded several newspaper cuttings in his letter. He stated 
when introducing the articles in his letter, that he fully supported their contents. Because 
of this statement I consider the two related articles to be useful in understanding the 
Norwegian diplomat’s point of view. The author further stated that the ones written by a 
"Mr. Gilbert" had caused a huge debate in China.155  
Rodney Gilbert published his two articles in the 22nd and 23rd of March issues of the 
North China Daily News in 1921. The online source Syracuse University Libraries 
describes Gilbert as a “conservative editorial writer and newspaper columnist.”156 The 
site also states that Gilbert was an American who had traveled to China in 1912 and 
ended up spending 17 years there, and that he also became fluent in Chinese. While 
living in China he worked as a correspondent for the North China Daily News. In 1926 
Gilbert’s columns in the paper were compiled into a book named: What’s Wrong with 
China.157 The site also highlights how Gilbert became a strong supporter of Chinese 
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nationalism and of Chiang Kai-shek' regime, as well as him being firmly anti-
Communist.158  
The author emphasized in the letter how he believed that one did not need to have 
resided long in China to understand how true the two articles were. He also stated that 
the Chinese students’ theories could not overshadow what he believed to be the hard 
truth. And according to him, that truth was that extraterritoriality should rather have 
ended during the Qing Empire than in 1921 (when he wrote the letter). He wrote that the 
reason for this was because back then there was at least a strong central Chinese 
government with a functioning administration enforcing its laws. This was something the 
author argued was the exact opposite of the situation at the time when he wrote his 
letter.159 
Another relevant letter was sent from Nicolai Aall on the 10th of February 1922 to the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.160 At first I did not know who the author of this 
letter was, but I later discovered a duplicate of letter that had been signed by Nicolai 
Aall.161 This letter starts off by affirming that the continuance of extraterritoriality had 
been a hot topic in China. It lists many of the same arguments as in the previous letter, 
such as how the Chinese students allegedly were trying to deceive the West into 
believing that China has matured enough to take full legal responsibility for every 
resident in the country. Aall also mentioned his discomfort with the Chinese practice of 
“Squeezing”. In the letter addressed to Colban it was described as a sort of bribe paid on 
sales and purchases, and was further compared to political corruption.162 Another issue 
that was highlighted in Aall’s letter was the case and trial of a Swedish citizen working 
for the harbor-police in Shanghai at the time.163 Aall stated that he wanted to provide a 
more accurate narrative of the actual situation in China. He also emphasized that it was 
neither his responsibility nor his intent to express any theoretical examination on the 
abolishment of extraterritoriality. Yet he argued that he ought to provide some examples 
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and he expressed hope that they would be taken into consideration when Norway had to 
make a decision on whether it wanted to keep its extraterritoriality or not. But even 
though Aall stated otherwise, the contents of his letter show that the intent most 
probably was to attempt to influence his superiors back home. 
 
3.3.3 No Guarantee for Basic Rights  
 
Firstly, the concerns mentioned in the sources relating to the diplomats’ expressed fear 
for their basic rights being violated if they were subjected to Chinese jurisdiction, will be 
examined. This worry is consistent with Gong's first requirement, especially since the 
foreigners stated that they feared that the Chinese authorities could not guarantee their 
basic rights in the county. 
The letter written to Colban began by telling that all foreigners living in China (and who 
knew the Chinese) were worried about what the author describes as “the Chinese 
students’ propaganda”. The author underlined that he is concerned that this propaganda 
might influence people who were unaware of the actual state of affairs in China.164 He 
wrote that it was crucial that those evaluating extraterritoriality in China realized how 
incapable China was of enforcing its own jurisdiction. The author argued his worry 
concerning that the Chinese authorities did not exercise enough authority to assure the 
wellbeing of the foreign population.  
This worry was also further emphasized in the letter written to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs which brought up the case and trial of the Swedish man employed in Shanghai's 
harbor-police.165 This Swede had while on duty had a quarrel with a Chinese sailor who 
had later been killed. The colleagues of the Chinese accused the Swede of being the 
murderer because of their earlier dispute. The Chinese authorities started an 
investigation and demanded that the Swede should be extradited to them. Aall 
emphasized that this request was fortunately declined and further emphasized that 
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without extraterritoriality to protect him he would have been executed for a crime he 
allegedly did not commit. He also stated that during the Swedish investigation it was not 
possible to find the witnesses that had sworn that the Swede was the murderer. He 
continued by stating that the Chinese autopsy had been hasty and sloppy and that the 
body had been buried before it could be properly examined.166 This case was also 
mentioned in a letter marked strictly confidential, written on the 17th of February 1922, in 
Shanghai, addressed to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.167 In this letter it was 
stated that the Swedish Consul-General had told the author that the Chinese 
Commissioner of Foreign Affairs had visited him. The Chinese Commissioner had then 
attempted to influence the Consul-General to alter the Swedish harbor policeman's 
verdict. The author also stated that the reason the Commissioner had given for wanting 
to punish the Swede was that he needed to comply with the Chinese people’s general 
opinion. The letter written to Colban also mentions an incident that had happened when 
the author visited a “Mr. E. Tollefsen” during Easter. Tollefsen was a Norwegian 
employed at the Postal Commissioners Office in Nanjing.168 The author stated that 
during that visit he had also met the American consul who had told him that the locals 
now frequently threw rocks at rickshaws with foreigners aboard. The author also added 
that he had heard several hostile shouts directed towards him while he had been 
walking the streets.  
 
 3.3.4 An Inefficient Bureaucracy  
 
China's allegedly ineffective bureaucracy is also frequently mentioned in the diplomatic 
letters. The critique is that China had not managed to construct an efficient bureaucracy. 
Therefore the sources highlight the same problems that Gong pinpointed as his second 
requirement. Gilbert for instance, addressed the Chinese bureaucracy's ineffectiveness 
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in his second article titled "Peking's Powerlessness: Provincial Mandarins a Law to 
Themselves (...)".169 He said in the opening lines of the article that:  
"The first argument against any immediate consideration of the abolition of 
Extraterritoriality is that no administration, whether it be in Peking (Beijing) or 
Canton, (Guangzhou) or in the provincial capitals, exercises sufficient authority 
over the military and civil officials in the territories which it governs"170 
The allegedly ineffectiveness of the Chinese government is also mentioned in the letter 
written to Colban. In this letter the author highlighted how he recently had been visited 
by two Norwegians residing in two different regions in China. These two had told him 
about the ill-deeds committed by Chinese soldiers. He then underlined how both of them 
had told him that they were only expecting more turmoil, looting and theft from the 
Chinese warlords' soldiers where they resided.171 The author then followed up by 
making this statement about the Chinese authorities: 
“The reality is that the government, or rather the governments (there are two now) 
are even unable to control their own soldiers, who seem to do whatever they 
desire when they aren’t getting their pay. And that is something that probably 
happens regularly.”172 
The author concluded the same letter by citing and seconding the remarks made by the 
Shanghai Municipal Council when suggesting that the Chinese within the international 
settlement should obtain communal voting rights.173 
“Never, (…) have chaos, disunion, and inefficient government been more marked 
in China’s annals than it is to-day. Until the condition of affairs has been righted, 
until China has firmly established good government, until she has carried out 
judicial reforms and has attuned to standards of efficiency, progress and 
development which are more in accord with our own, this backdoor method of 
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working for the abolition of Extraterritoriality must be defeated. It is not in our 
interests, it is not in the interests of our fellow Chinese residents, - and my views, 
I know are shared by a large number of thinking Chinese.”174 
Gilbert ended his article by underlining that China would not be content before being 
able abolishing foreign extraterritoriality.  
“We are going to hear more of this from Geneva. All Chinese, not to mention a 
foreign agent or so, who are bound for Switzerland, are primed with sad stories of 
China’s disabilities under the extraterritorial provisions. It would not be amiss if 
those who assemble at Geneva were provided with a few facts about the 
disabilities of the Chinese people under their own judicial and administrative 
systems.”175 
Essentially, Gilbert argued that the Chinese were much better in identifying the flaws of 
the practice of extraterritoriality than they were in acknowledging their own system's 
limitations.      
 
 3.3.5  Adherence to International Law and an Effective Legal System  
 
Gong listed the necessity of having an effective and just legal system. The Chinese legal 
system is frequently criticized in the diplomatic letters. These primary sources suggest 
that the foreigners in China did not hold the Chinese legal system in high regard.     
Nicolai Aall stated in the letter written to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10th of 
February 1922 that he considered the Chinese students’ knowledge of both foreign law 
and China to be questionable.176 He argued that the students who were agitating for the 
abolition of extraterritoriality, considered the Chinese laws to be in coherence with the 
necessities required for having extraterritoriality abolished. Even though he gave this 
claim some recognition; he still argued that the students ignore the detail that these 
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modernized laws simply were not being practiced by Chinese judges. He added that 
these laws did not enforce themselves. He then justified this claim by saying that those 
who should enforce and practice these laws were easily bribed, manipulated and 
regarded other concerns higher than the laws they were supposed to uphold.177 He also 
claimed that it was engraved in Chinese culture that all officials needed to acquire 
personal gain from every economic transaction. This allegedly corrupt tendency is 
something that the diplomats frequently described as “squeezing”.178 Aall also added 
that this tendency applied to every Chinese in all social classes, high as well as low. He 
further added that judges and other functionaries in public offices were easily bribed by 
various kinds of “considerations”.179 Aall further described the entire Chinese 
bureaucracy as thoroughly corrupt and highlighted that “squeezing” was not even 
considered dishonest among the Chinese.180 
Gilbert also mentioned the Chinese legal system in his article and emphasized that 
China did not have any "uniform judicial system, and no justice of a sort for that matter". 
Gilbert also brought up the allegedly corrupt tendency of the Chinese officials, and 
claimed that they had more concern towards personal gain though bribes than righteous 
justice.181  
These sources suggest that the authors of the letters doubted China’s ability to 
immediately incorporate a satisfactory Western-styled system into its bureaucracy. They 
argued that the Chinese magistrates practiced many corrupt tendencies that were in no 
way on par with their Western counterparts. Hence they claimed that China had to 
properly deal with these issues before the foreigners could even consider having 
extraterritoriality abolished.  
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 3.3.6  The Maintenance of Diplomatic Relations 
 
Gong’s fourth requirement underlines that China needed to maintain a functioning 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to sustain its diplomatic relations with foreign powers. When 
addressing this issue it is important to mention that the Beiyang government that 
represented China diplomatically during the early 1920s, was internationally recognized 
as the legitimate government of China. Westad mentions how the foreign powers tried to 
keep a semblance of central power afloat in China during the era of the warlords. The 
foreign powers did so by offering the Beiyang Government several significant loans.182 
Westad also makes clear that no foreign power at the time wanted a complete 
fragmentation of China.183 This notion is also consistent with how the Nine-Power Treaty 
from 1922 declared:  
"To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and 
administrative integrity of China"184 
This shows that most of the treaty powers officially supported China’s right to exist as a 
sovereign nation. However, this declaration was rather made to prevent one another 
from further expansion than because of the treaty powers’ sympathetic concerns 
towards the Chinese. 
The treaty powers thus recognized the Beiyang government as China’s legitimate 
government; therefore it would have been surprising if the Norwegian diplomats had 
argued differently. However, this didn’t prevent the diplomats from questioning the 
means the Chinese used to gain Western support for the abolition of extraterritoriality. In 
the letter to Colban, the author claimed that even though it may seem reasonable that 
China, just like Japan, should no longer be bound by extraterritoriality, China was not 
ready for such a responsibility. He continued this argumentation by stating that the 
students who had been studying at Western universities most likely had learned the 
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Western way of “thinking” and thus might be able to convince many to support their 
cause.185 He added that he was afraid that people lacking the insight into the conditions 
in China might be swayed by these seemingly reasonable arguments. The author also 
emphasized that many Westerners supporting the end of extraterritoriality, did so for the 
wrong reasons.186 He justified this claim by underlining that the reason for why China 
managed to get some Westerners’ support was because those Westerners believed 
they would get something in return. He continued by emphasizing that it was primarily 
the Germans who supported the abolition of extraterritoriality. The author then 
suggested that since the Germans already had lost their extraterritoriality, they had 
nothing to lose, but much to gain by supporting the Chinese. The historian William C. 
Kirby brings up the German post-extraterritoriality position in his book, Germany and 
Republican China.187 Kirby claims that the German position paradoxically got 
strengthened after its loss of extraterritoriality. The ongoing Chinese Civil War made the 
country the world’s biggest consumer of weapons and this detail attracted many German 
arms manufacturers.188 Kirby also brings up how the Chinese Nationalists sought to 
focus German interests directly on China, and worked towards a cooperative agreement 
that secured German support for their own party.189 This indicates that Gilbert had valid 
reasons when pointing out that the Germans indeed had their own ulterior motives for 
supporting China. It was however, not only the Germans who supported the Chinese in 
their quest to remove extraterritoriality. The Chinese also attained support from the 
Soviet Union. Kayaoğlu stresses that since Soviet was profoundly anti-imperialistic, it did 
its best to help China in the struggle against imperialism.190 Westad seconds this view 
and stresses that Soviet considered it its main task in China to help the Chinese 
nationalistic movement to triumph, before any kind of socialism could be applied in the 
country.191 
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Gilbert believed that the Chinese government had told every Chinese student who went 
abroad to study at Western universities that they had to campaign for the abolition of 
extraterritoriality. Gilbert also claimed that the Chinese students’ great exaggeration of 
the laws that had been made by the Chinese Ministry of Justice, was an insult to 
common sense. He stated that the whole foreign community needed to oppose what he 
believed to be a misrepresentation of extraterritoriality, and how he was worried that this 
distortion could gain credence within the international community.192 The foundation, on 
which Gilbert based these assumptions, is not a pure factual one, but it is rather based 
on personal emotional arguments. 
 
 3.3.7  The Compliance with Western Norms and Values 
 
The Norwegian diplomats suggested that the Chinese values were not comparable to 
the norms held by the Western world. Gong's fifth requirement, compliance with Western 
norms and values, is therefore something the Norwegian diplomats argued was not 
fulfilled by China. “Squeezing” has already been brought up as one example of Chinese 
practices that the authors believed to be profoundly corrupt. Aall stated in his the letter to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that torture happened regularly in China even though the 
Chinese authorities denied it.193  
Gilbert also highlighted how the Beiyang government was unable to stop the opium-
growing in their provinces and how powerless the government was in constraining the 
warlords.194 He also emphasized that he believed that it was dangerous to be rich in 
China because of the corruption within the Chinese bureaucracy. Gilbert claimed that no 
Chinese businessman could afford to start an enterprise without having a partnership 
with, and the support of the local officials.195 In his article Gilbert wrote that if China was 
not able to show the world that it could provide righteous justice for its own citizens, then 
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extraterritoriality would certainly prevail.196 He also stated that he hoped that the foreign 
community in China should not make the same mistake as the Russians. “The Russian, 
deprived of his extraterritorial rights, is back where he was 300 years ago. He is a “wai-
fan” an outer barbarian". According to Gilbert this meant that the Chinese yet again 
considered the Russians to be inferior to them.197  
 
 3.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined how and why the Norwegian diplomats responded to the 
Eight-Power Resolution. In doing so an exploration of how the primary sources have 
raised several arguments for why the diplomats argued that extraterritoriality in China 
needed to prevail, has been carried out. This has uncovered how the diplomats 
expressed a worry that China was incapable of guaranteeing the foreigners a fair 
treatment under Chinese jurisdiction. Thereby an investigation of how and why the 
Norwegian diplomats attempted to influence their colleagues into sharing their opinions 
on extraterritoriality in China, has been preformed. This investigation revealed how the 
diplomats argued in their letters that China was not prepared for the responsibilities that 
would follow if extraterritoriality should be abandoned. The arguments have been 
grouped into five sections, inspired by how Gerrit Gong lists the five requirements he 
argues the major foreign powers required of China before extraterritoriality could be 
removed. Some of the arguments that the diplomats frequently listed were how they 
believed that China could not defend its own citizens from the atrocities committed by 
the warlords, as well as the corruption within the Chinese bureaucracy. Other examples 
were how China in reality did not practice their westernized laws. The Norwegian 
diplomats voiced a fear that all foreigners would have their rights violated by the Chinese 
authorities if extraterritoriality was to be removed.  
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Chapter IV  
The Potential Adherence to                
the Eight-Power Resolution  
 
 4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter addressed how the Norwegian diplomats felt threatened by the 
Eight-Power Resolution because it declared an intent to investigate foreign 
extraterritoriality in China. This chapter will explore how and why the Norwegian 
diplomats advised the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo to make Norway accede to the 
Eight-Power Resolution and in doing so making Norway participate in the upcoming 
Commission on Extraterritoriality. The significant feature of the said Eight-Power 
Resolution was that it agreed to establish and assemble the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality hence the results of the commission will also be addressed in this 
chapter. This adheres to the research question highlighted in chapter one because it will 
continue the investigation of how Norway decided to position itself in regard to the Eight-
Power Resolution as well as the Commission on Extraterritoriality.  
Hence the primary sub-question in this chapter is the following: 1) how did Norway 
position itself in regard to the Eight-Power Resolution? Another related sub-
question that will be investigated is: 2) how and why did the Norwegian diplomats 
advice the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to arrange for Norwegian representation in 
the Commission on Extraterritoriality? Additionally, the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality’s results will be explored through the following sub-question: 3) what 
were the results of the Commission on Extraterritoriality? The reasoning behind 
why all these sub-questions will be explored in this chapter, is primarily because they 
jointly investigate the first genuine initiatives initiated by the treaty powers to evaluate 
the continuance of extraterritoriality. Furthermore, since this chapter investigates these 
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questions through the narratives given in the Norwegian primary sources, this is highly 
relevant for the thesis’ overall research focus.  
 
 4.2 Opening Remarks  
 
Kayaoğlu points to that the Beiyang government and many Chinese intellectuals had 
grown increasingly frustrated with how the Western states were benefiting from China's 
weakened position.198 The Beiyang government had attempted to westernize its laws to 
make them appear more appealing to the treaty powers. This attempt persuaded the 
great powers reevaluate the status of extraterritoriality.199 Because of this, the Eight-
Power Resolution declared that the signatory states were potentially willing to reconsider 
their position on extraterritoriality if the Commission on Extraterritoriality deemed China’s 
attempt at reform to be satisfactory.200 Norway also qualified to adhere to the resolution, 
since the resolution stated that the non-signatory states having extraterritoriality through 
a treaty with China, could accede to the resolution.201 Hence the possible Norwegian 
adherence will be addressed in this chapter. However, this will follow after we have 
explored a hypothesis presented by the contemporary Norwegian political-scientist 
Halvard Leira, in regards to how Norway sought international political recognition after its 
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 4.3 The Norwegian Status Seeking 
 
How Norway was seeking international recognition is discussed by Leira in his article: 
The formative years - Norway as an obsessive status-seeker in the book-collaboration 
project: Small State Status Seeking (2015).202 Leira argues that after Norway had 
become a fully independent nation in 1905 it altered its strategy on how it sought 
international recognition. It was no longer only Sweden that the Norwegian government 
wanted to match up to, but also other minor European states.203 While dealing with this 
topic Leira cites the words of an unnamed Norwegian diplomat, who Leira claims had 
been serving in the joint Swedish-Norwegian diplomatic service. According to Leira this 
individual had stated that one could divide the lesser powers into two different categories 
during a meeting dealing with how Norway should consolidate its diplomatic service.204 
The countries in the first-class rank were the nations of Denmark, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Sweden-Norway and sometimes also Portugal. Their representatives 
participated in their ambassadorial social duties, they were well known by their 
colleagues and thus properly represented their countries with dignity. The other group 
consisted of countries such as Serbia, Romania, Greece and occasionally also 
Switzerland. Their diplomats rarely participated in any social gatherings and were 
therefore rather unknown in comparison to the first group. Leira further highlights how 
the Norwegian diplomat had stated that Sweden would undoubtedly continue to be a 
part of the first group and so should Norway. He then emphasized the importance of 
Norwegian diplomats being adequately salaried to represent Norway appropriately. Most 
Norwegians lacked the personal wealth required for upholding their diplomatic social 
obligations. Hence it was very important for him that the diplomats had adequate 
salaries to prevent them from becoming like the Greeks who he stated were not known 
by anyone.205  
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This chapter will explore how Leira's concept of Norwegian status seeking is consistent 
with the general message that was being emphasized by the Norwegian diplomats in 
their numerous letters addressed to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
concerning the possible adherence to the Eight-Power Resolution.  
This consistency can be explained by two underlying reasons. The first motive is likely 
because of the arguments that were examined in the previous chapter, namely that the 
Norwegian diplomats did not want to lose their extraterritorial privileges in China. 
Consequently, they worked hard to preserve their extraterritoriality; and the Commission 
on Extraterritoriality was the exact forum fighting for the perseverance of those 
privileges. The second reason, and the main issue of this chapter, is how Norway could 
maintain its international status by being one of the participating powers of the said 
commission. I will also examine how the Norwegian diplomats used Norway’s strife for 
international status as a means to convince the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to get matters 
solved their way.  
 
 4.4 The Possible Adherence to the Eight-Power Resolution 
 
In this section I will look into which kinds of arguments the Norwegian diplomats listed 
for why they believed it was advisable that Norway adhered to the Eight-Power 
Resolution and in doing so, also participating in the upcoming Commission on 
Extraterritoriality. It is also crucial to underline what happened in China during the time 
when these letters were written. Hence I will readdress the May Fourth Movement's 
significance as a political context. Westad states that the May Fourth Movement marked 
the beginning of the era of Chinese nationalism.206 This view is also seconded by 
Mackerras who states that the May Fourth Movement can be described as a whole 
range of progressive processes making the Chinese intellectual and cultural 
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transformation following Japan’s Twenty-One Demands towards China.207 Westad 
states that the new opportunities that the May Fourth Movement put forward in 1919 and 
onwards inspired Sun Yat-sen to reenact his old revolutionary ways.208 He continues by 
affirming that Sun was inspired by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, and how he 
admired the Soviets for their ruthless efficiency. Even though Sun was never a 
Communist, he was motivated by their promise of making a backward country rich and 
strong through their Soviet-style Communism.209 Hence the new Kuomintang or the 
Chinese Nationalist Party was formed and unified through Sun’s Three Principles of the 
People: nationalism, democracy, and the people’s livelihood.210 Westad also underlines 
that the Soviets considered it their main task in China to strengthen Sun Yat-sen’s 
movement in order to seize control over the country. This was because Lenin and his 
successor Stalin, both believed that China needed a nationalistic revolution before 
socialism could become applicable. The Soviet Union's support turned the Chinese 
Nationalists into a significant force by the mid-1920s.211  
Bearing this historical context in mind, we will first look into the relevant letters' contents 
chronologically, and then discuss them thematically afterwards. In doing so we will 
explore how the debate was developing, before analyzing the arguments that were 
made in the letters.  We will then attempt to distinguish the arguments that convinced 
Norway to make a political turnabout by adhering to the Eight-Power Resolution.  
 
 4.4.1 The Debate Concerning the Norwegian Adherence  
 
One of the first letters that mentioned the possible Norwegian adherence to the Eight-
Power Resolution was an unsigned correspondence written in Beijing on the 17th of 
February 1922 addressed to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since this letter 
is unsigned one cannot know for certain who wrote it. However, it is likely that Johan 
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Michelet had at least vouched for it, since it had been sent from the Norwegian legation 
in Beijing, the diplomatic institution that he was charge of at the time. Nevertheless, the 
author of this letter started off presuming that the Ministry had already been informed by 
the American Government about the Eight-Power resolution and how Norway might 
adhere to it.  He also stated that he and his colleagues believed that the upcoming 
Commission on Extraterritoriality would result in a status quo.212 More concrete 
information was revealed in a letter sent on 28th of February 1922 to the Legation in 
Beijing from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This letter contained a rather 
interesting attachment that the Ministry had received from the Norwegian Department of 
Justice on February 21, 1922.213  
This attachment concerned the Danish legation's inquiry to the Norwegian Department 
of Justice about how Norway was going to position itself on the matter of the 
continuance of foreign extraterritoriality in China.214 The Department of Justice had 
concluded on the basis of the contents of the letter that the Legation in Beijing sent to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 1st of December the previous year, that Norway 
would likely endorse the arrangement agreed to by the signatory sates of the Eight-
Power Resolution. Furthermore, it was argued that since Norway would not possess 
much influence over the result of the said Commission on Extraterritoriality, it would be 
futile for Norway to join it and be an active participant.      
This view was challenged by Nicolai Aall in a fairly detailed letter written on the 29th of 
May 1922 to the Norwegian Legation in Beijing.215 In this letter Aall questioned the 
Norwegian Department of Justice's belief that Norway ought not to participate in the 
Commission on Extraterritoriality. Aall agreed that at first sight it seemed reasonable to 
believe that there were not many satisfactory reasons for making Norway participate. 
However, Aall also stressed that this view could not be further from the truth. The 
Department of Justice had stated that it believed it to be pointless for Norway to 
participate since the Norwegian representatives would likely not have any determining 
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say in the given commission. Aall admitted that Norway would not enjoy much influence 
over the commission, but he also believed that this premise begged the question, since 
it already assumed to know the commission's outcome. This flaw made Aall consider it 
an insufficient reason to prevent Norway from joining the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality. Aall instead argued for why he believed that Norway in fact had much 
to gain by participating. He emphasized that Norway was one of the many powers 
enjoying extraterritorial rights and because of this Norwegian citizens in China benefitted 
from this right every day. For that reason many Norwegians living in China were strongly 
interested in the matter, and they wanted to keep their privileges.216 
Aall also argued that since Norway was going to be represented in the upcoming Tariff 
Conference217 which only affected financial matters, then why was is not right for 
Norway to be represented on the Commission on Extraterritoriality which after all was 
dealing with the rights, wellbeing and safety of all Norwegian citizens living in China. 
Aall also emphasized that the topic had another aspect that he believed the Department 
of Justice was unaware of, namely the question of recognition. Aall brought to light the 
fact that Norway had attained its extraterritoriality through a treaty with China. So 
according to Aall it was reasonable to assume that Norway was highly interested in 
every topic relating to this privilege. Aall continued this argumentation by stressing that if 
Norway was going to let the great powers represent itself in all similar cases; then 
Norway would eventually end up being considered among the states that the great 
powers as well as the Chinese, had nearly stopped to take into any kind of account. Aall 
also stressed how he believed that it was more advantageous for Norway to have a 
Norwegian representation on the upcoming commission, than for instance to send a 
Norwegian warship to China, something that he stated had already been considered by 
the Norwegian government. He carried on arguing that even if none of the Norwegian 
diplomats in China were capable of representing Norway because of their bias; it would 
still be less expensive for Norway to send an impartial delegate to the commission than 
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sending a Norwegian warship all the way to China. He added that if the commission 
decided that the time of extraterritoriality in China had come to an end, then China would 
certainly remember with gratitude the nations that participated on the commission.218 
A letter written in Beijing on the 4th of June 1922 addressed to the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry revealed that Aall’s views were being seconded.219 The Legation in Beijing 
seemed to have been persuaded by Aall's arguments and shared his eagerness for a 
Norwegian participation on the commission. However, the author also stressed that he 
believed it was pointless to appoint a local Norwegian representative since the 
commission was supposed to be unbiased. He also stated that the only reason that he 
was slightly hesitant was because the monetary expenses could become costly. 
Furthermore he suggested that one of the bureaucrats within the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs ought to represent Norway since it was advantageous that someone 
working for the Ministry acquired some knowledge about the affairs in East Asia. The 
author could possibly have his own ulterior motives for specifically suggesting this. It 
would certainly have benefitted for the Norwegian diplomats in China to attain 
connections within the Ministry with a firsthand understanding of the state of affairs in 
China.   
The possible expenses a participation could cost Norway is highlighted in another letter 
written on 29th of April 1922 that was sent from the Norwegian Legation in Washington to 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This letter revealed that the Americans had 
dedicated 21 thousand dollars to pay for the expenses for the American representation 
on the commission.220  
Another subject is brought up in a letter written on the 25th of August 1923 written by the 
leader of the Norwegian Legation in Beijing, Johan Michelet, addressed to the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.221  In this letter Michelet stated that for the time 
being, he as well as all of his colleges could not imagine any country except the United 
States that full-heartedly wanted to address the abolishment of extraterritoriality. In the 
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same letter he also brought up how two recent cases where foreigners were sentenced 
under Chinese jurisdiction had shocked the foreign community in China.  
Now that we have finished exploring the letters that dealt with the possible Norwegian 
adherence to the Eight-Power Resolution, it is time to start to discuss and analyze their 
contents. 
 
4.4.2 The Reasons For and Against the Norwegian Adherence  
 
Comparing this debate to the letters that were explored in the previous chapter; we see 
that the general debate has shifted from how the diplomats believed that 
extraterritoriality needed to prevail during the preceding years (before 1923), to how they 
now thought that the Kingdom of Norway should act on the matter. That being said, I 
have discovered some examples within the letters (from 1923 to 25) stating how 
extraterritoriality is a necessity for the prosperity and wellbeing of the foreigners in 
China, for instance in the letter from August 25. 1923. Nevertheless, I believe that this 
shift of focus suggests that the diplomats have settled themselves more into the new 
circumstances. They are now doing their utmost to make the best out of a situation they 
are not fully comfortable with. It seems that their new primary focus is to attempt to make 
Norway seem as influential as possible. To be a participant on the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality would undoubtedly strengthen the Norwegian legitimacy for keeping its 
extraterritorial privileges.    
With all of that being said, I will now start to analyze the several reasons given for and 
against the Norwegian adherence to the Eight-Power Resolution. The letter that Nicolai 
Aall wrote to the Norwegian Legation in Beijing from the 29th of May 1922 reveals many 
of the key aspects of the entire adherence debate. Status and prestige are some of the 
primary reasons Aall highlighted for why he believed it was important that Norway 
should participate on the commission. He stressed that it was essential that Norway 
showed both China and the great powers that it was one of the treaty powers and 
considered extraterritoriality to be an important topic that needed to be addressed.   
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If Norway took the chance of not participating on the Commission on Extraterritoriality, it 
would signalize Norwegian indifference not only to the Chinese government but also to 
the treaty powers. This could also make Norway seem weak to the treaty powers, and 
would make Norway seem like a state that could not properly look after its own interests. 
This worry is consistent with Leira’s hypothesis that stresses how important it was for 
Norway to gain international recognition at the time.  
Aall also stressed in the same letter from 29th of May 1922 that Norway could risk 
becoming a passive treaty power state by not participating in any meetings in China. Aall 
believed that it was disadvantageous to allow the other powers to represent themselves 
without any kind of Norwegian interference. This could possibly not only signify 
Norwegian weakness, but also indicate that Norway was oblivious and uninterested in 
extraterritoriality in general. This indifference could potentially make the other treaty 
powers start to question Norway’s justification for maintaining its extraterritoriality. 
Norwegian indifference could also signify to other treaty power states that Norway could 
not afford to participate in partially mandatory diplomatic meetings. Norwegian lack of 
interest in this matter would also be rather paradoxical since the Norwegian foreign 
policy during the time embraced as well as tried to strengthen international law. 
Therefore ignoring this matter would be rather contradictory to this policy. Another 
important issue that Aall brought up was that a Norwegian participation would matter 
very much to all Norwegian citizens who resided in China at the time.  
I will not speculate on how vast the expense of 21 thousand US-Dollars would have 
been to the Norwegian state at the time. The important thing is that the sources suggest 
that every Norwegian diplomat at the time seemed to deem the expenses to be rather 
high. However, Aall also emphasized that even though it might be costly to send a 
diplomat all the way from Norway to participate on the commission, it would still be 
cheaper than to send a warship to China. It is reasonable to assume that since Aall 
specifically mentioned the possibility of sending a Norwegian warship to China, this 
notion had already been a topic for discussion. This topic had presumably been brought 
up as a possible means to help dealing with the piracy problem along the Chinese coast. 
This issue is also brought up by Seeberg and Filseth. They write that piracy in China 
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increased tremendously from the mid-1920s and further mention that this made Norway 
discuss the possibility of sending a warship.222 Since the shipping industry was Norway’s 
greatest economic interest in China, the notion of sending a Norwegian warship could 
therefore had been an option that the Norwegian government considered at the time. 
However, Seeberg and Filseth further state that even when a Norwegian ship was 
captured by pirates who stole valuables for the worth of 20’000 dollars, the Norwegian 
Consulate-General recommended that Norway abstained from sending a warship.223 
They further state that this was because the Consulate-General believed that it was 
important that Norway was not considered among the imperialistic states, since they had 
become an increasing target of the Chinese Nationalists' strategy.224 
The earlier mentioned sources also suggested that the Norwegian diplomats were rather 
confident that the Commission on Extraterritoriality would end with a status quo 
concerning foreign extraterritoriality. They also implied that they believed that only the 
United States was properly willing to alter the practice of extraterritoriality at that time.  
It is important to mention that even though Norway did not adhere to the Eight-Power 
Resolution before in 1925, most of the correspondence concerning the adherence 
happened between 1922 and 1923. This was likely because the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality was delayed several times. Originally it was supposed to assemble only 
three months after the Washington Conference;225 but it was postponed due to the 
ongoing armed conflict in close proximity to Beijing.226 The problem surrounding the 
commission's postponement was also mentioned in a letter that Johan Michelet sent 
from Beijing on the 19th of December 1925. Michelet stated that the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality had been delayed because of the civil war at the time, which had 
caused the railroad service to shut down. Hence the commission could not start its work 
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on the 18th as originally anticipated.227 This problem resulted in that the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality did not assemble before the 12th of January 1926.228 
 
 4.5 The Norwegian adherence to the Eight-Power Resolution 
 
After examining the arguments the Norwegian diplomats in China made for why they 
believed it advisable to adhere to the Eight-Power Resolution, it is time to explore the 
actual Norwegian adherence. Even though there are some letters concerning the 
possible Norwegian adherence to the Commission during the year of 1924, it is not 
before the 16th of October 1925 that a new highly relevant letter was sent from the 
legation in Beijing to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 229 The author of this 
letter urged the Ministry to determine whether or not Norway would adhere to the 
Washington Resolution and appoint a delegate to the Commission on Extraterritoriality. 
He also stressed that many of the other treaty powers including Sweden and Denmark, 
had already appointed their delegates to the said commission. He further notified the 
Ministry that the two Scandinavian delegates had informed him that they only intended 
to participate passively in the assembly.  
Finally, it was stated in a letter dated October 31. 1925 that Norway had decided to 
adhere to the Eight-Power Resolution. This letter sent from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to the Consulate General in Shanghai, further declared that Norway had 
decided to accede to the resolution on October 23.230 The letter also revealed that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was allowed to appoint a member to the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality. A similar letter was also sent to the Norwegian Legation in Beijing on 
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the same day that notified the legation about Norway's decision to adhere to the Eight-
Power Resolution.231 
Mackerras highlights another important issue that was significant for the development of 
China's autonomy which happened during the mid 1920s; namely, that the British 
government in 1925 had abandoned its former strategy of "gunboat diplomacy"232,233 
This new British approach ultimately led to the British handing back several of its former 
concessions in China to the advancing Chinese nationalists. Mackerras stresses that 
this development was important not only for the Nationalist Revolution, but also since it 
symbolized the first phase of British imperial retreat from China.234 It is therefore 
plausible that Britain's higher emphasis on a diplomatic approach towards China also 
inspired Norway to play a more active part within the negotiations. Nevertheless, 
Britain's change of approach definitely gave China a stronger hand in terms of its 
negotiation power.  
 
 4.5.1 The Discussion that Occurred in Norway  
 
So far I have primarily explored the debate seen from the Norwegian diplomats in 
China's perspective. Now it is time to shift focus and look at how the adherence debate 
was perceived when brought up in the Norwegian Parliament.  
The declaration of the Norwegian adherence to the Eight-Power Resolution is included 
in the register of the Norwegian parliamentary negotiations named: 
Stortingsforhandlinger.1926 6b.235 The goals of the Commission on Extraterritoriality are 
also clarified in this proclamation. These were: to study how extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
                                            
231
 Riksarkivet. Utenriksstasjonene, Generalkonsulatet i Shanghai, S-2611/Db/L0238/0002.- 2363 
232
 “The gunboat diplomacy” (or - Big Stick ideology) was a pursuit of foreign objectives through the 
display of naval superiority. This ideology implied a threat of war if the terms that were pressed were not 
agreed upon. The earlier discussed First Opium War is an example of this ideology in action.  
233
 Mackerras, China in Transformation p. 49 
234
 Ibid. p. 49 
235
 Nasjonalbiblioteket. Stortingforhandlinger. 1926 6b Oslo: J. CHR. Gundersen Boktrykkeri. Accessed 
on: October 24. 2015 Accessible from: 
<http://www.nb.no/statsmaktene/nb/b2d79a7a5832f7e03fd2d750cf3d00be?index=0#447> p. 448 
His 350 Jens Tepstad 69 
 
practiced in China and to propose recommendations on which reforms that are needed 
to make the treaty powers consent to abolish their extraterritoriality. It also stated that 
the two supplementary resolutions allowed other powers that had valid treaties with 
China, including Norway, to adhere to the resolution. Hence it made clear that Norway 
could also accede to the resolution, because Norwegian citizens had enjoyed 
extraterritorial privileges in China since the original Sino-Swedish-Norwegian Treaty of 
Canton from 1847. The declaration elucidated that nations could participate on the 
Commission on Extraterritoriality by sending a declaration to the government of the 
United States. It is also stressed that the signatory powers were not in any way bound to 
follow the Commission's advice on the matter. Another important fact that was brought 
to light was that China had declared its willingness to cooperate with the commission.236 
Hence the source suggested that the Norwegian Parliament was well aware of the 
general circumstances surrounding the Eight-Power Resolution before deciding to make 
Norway adhere to it. 
The declaration clarified why Norway finally decided to adhere to the Eight-Power 
Resolution. The primary reason given in the document was that the Norwegian 
representatives in China had strongly advised the government to do so. The reasoning 
listed is essentially a summary of the reasons listed by the diplomats in China that was 
explored earlier in this chapter. That is that the diplomats had stressed that it was in the 
interest of the Norwegian citizens who lived there that Norway joined. The diplomats had 
argued that this action was needed for securing the Norwegian citizens’ personal 
wellbeing and security. It is also mentioned that further reasons for adhering were the 
need to maintain Norway’s status and ranking internationally, and that it would be a 
better advertisement than the other proposed arrangements.237 The fact that to 
participate on the Commission on Extraterritoriality would be a better way to uphold 
Norwegian status than all other conceivable actions, was also brought up as a reason 
for the Norwegian adherence.  
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This source suggests that the arguments that were made by the Norwegian 
representatives in China, did in fact convince the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make 
Norway accede to the commission.  
We see that many of the arguments that were made in the correspondence from the 
Norwegian diplomats in China were also highlighted as reasons for why Norway 
adhered to the Commission. It seems that this adherence was caused by two primary 
motives. The first being Norway’s search for status and international recognition. Norway 
would gain status if it was represented on the commission thus showing the world that 
Norway was amongst the decision maker nations. The second reason was the economic 
considerations; it would be much cheaper for Norway to participate on the commission 
rather than for instance sending a warship all the way to China. Norway was a rather 
poor nation at the time, yet it desired to be amongst the well respected nations. 
Therefore, with all these concerns in mind, the middle ground decision was essentially 
the most realistic action out of all the desired ones. 
 
4.6 The Commission on Extraterritoriality 
 
The last section of this chapter will first look into how the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the diplomats in China decided upon who was going to represent Norway on 
the Commission on Extraterritoriality. Afterwards it will address and examine the reports 
that the Norwegian representative sent to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs while 
the Commission on Extraterritoriality was assembled. The final part of this chapter will 
address the Commission on Extraterritoriality’s most important declarations, and see 
how those declarations affected the general extraterritoriality discourse.   
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 4.6.1 Deciding on a Norwegian Delegate 
  
The question of who was going to represent Norway was raised in a letter Johan 
Michelet wrote on the 18th of September 1925. In this letter Michelet encouraged the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry to appoint Nicolai Aall to be the Norwegian representative. 
One reason for why Michelet wanted Aall to represent Norway, was the fact that he had 
previous experience as a consular judge. Michelet also brought up the fact that Aall had 
already worked on the question of the abolishment of extraterritoriality in Thailand and 
thus he could provide prior relevant knowledge to the commission.238 The reasons for 
why Michelet wanted the Ministry to appoint Aall instead of himself could be to-fold. The 
first reason could be that Michelet had no particular interests in being appointed, and 
therefore wanted someone else to represent Norway. The second reason could be that 
Michelet actually full heartedly believed that Aall would do a better job than himself 
because of his prior experience.  
However, the commission was supposed to have representatives that were free of 
prejudice against the Chinese bureaucracy. This issue was brought up in another letter 
that was written by Michelet on the 9th of October 1925, addressed to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In this letter it was stated that Belgium had decided to appoint one of 
their consuls to the commission, and therefore Michelet believed that there would no 
problem if Norway decided to do the same.239  
Nonetheless, it was in fact Michelet himself, and not Aall who was chosen by the 
Ministry to represent Norway on the commission. This was confirmed in a letter written 
by Michelet on the 15th on December 1925 addressed to the Norwegian Consulate-
General.240 Unfortunately no reason was given in this letter for why Michelet and not Aall 
was chosen. However, the reason was presumably left out intentionally since the letter 
was sent to the institution that Aall was in charge of. The most probable reason for why 
Michelet was chosen was because he was stationed in Beijing where the commission 
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was going to assemble. I make this presumption because of what the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated in the earlier mentioned letter that was written to the Legation in Beijing on 
the 31st of October 1925.241 This letter declared that the Ministry was likely going to 
appoint Nicolai Aall as the delegate if the commission was held in Shanghai. This letter 
further stated that if the commission was not going to meet in Shanghai, then Norway 
was most likely not going to appoint any member at all to the commission. Yet Norway 
participated in the commission, and the commission was not held in Shanghai but in 
Beijing. This suggests that the reason for why it was Michelet who participated was his 
geographical location since this would save Norway the travel expenses. However, it 
might also be because of other reasons such as him being persuaded into going by 
either Aall or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
 4.6.2 The Reports from the Commission on Extraterritoriality 
 
Some interesting details are revealed in a letter that Michelet sent right after the 
Commission's first assembly. This letter reported back to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
about how the initial meeting went. In this report which was dated on the 12th of January 
1926, Michelet explained how the other foreign delegates had opposed the notion to 
allow a Chinese official to become an honorary chairman. The reason they had given for 
this opposition was because they believed that this official would then attempt to 
influence the commission. Michelet then brought up that he had suggested that the 
Chinese Minister of Justice should be appointed as the commission’s honorary 
president. By doing so China would attain its “face” (reputation) and at the same time the 
Minister would not have had any opportunity to influence the commission in any way. 
This was because he would not have become a member of the commission and 
therefore he could not partake in any of the meetings. This notion had then been 
accepted by all the foreign delegates. Michelet also mentioned how the foreign 
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delegates wanted to keep the meetings discreet, whereas the Chinese government 
wanted to give them as much publicity as possible.242  
Regrettably I have not been able to find any other letters sent from Michelet that deals 
with the Commission on Extraterritoriality's undertakings. The most probable reason for 
this silence is that Michelet did the same as the two other delegates from the 
Scandinavian nations, namely only participate passively. The only exception is a letter 
that he sent from Beijing to the Consulate-General in Shanghai on February 6. 1926.243 
In this letter he stated that he had been absent from the commissions’ last meeting, but 
they had decided to gather information about the various treaty powers' practice of 
extraterritoriality. Hence he requested the consulate to send him the necessary 
information as soon as possible.244  
Now that we have examined the Norwegian correspondence sent from the Commission 
on Extraterritoriality it is time to explore the commissions’ declarations. 
 
4.6.3 The Commission on Extraterritoriality’s Outcome 
 
The American Journal of International Law at the time shortened all the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality’s declarations in to an eight page long summary.245 The summary is 
divided into four parts, in which the first deals with the practice of extraterritoriality at the 
time. The second part is about the Chinese judicial and prison system. The third part 
concerns the Chinese Administration of Justice. The most relevant part for my research 
is the fourth part which concerns the commission’s joint recommendations. I will focus 
my attention on the fourth part because of its relevance to my research.   
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In short, the first section of the list of recommendations deals with how China needed to 
modernize its administration of justice. This list highlighted many different things that the 
commission believed needed to be altered in China. It included how the commission 
stressed the need of having institutions shielded from unwarranted interference from 
other branches of the Chinese government. The commission also listed several laws 
that China needed to put into practice, such as a Civil Code.246 China’s need for a 
uniform judicial system was also emphasized in the list; this was because the 
commission believed that a clarity regarding the current laws that were in practice would 
prevent much of the malpractice surrounding the Chinese laws at the time. It stressed 
the need for new modern courts and prisons and the elimination of the old system. The 
commission also stressed that China needed to pay adequate financial provisions to its 
courts and prisons.247  
The commission further called for that the treaty powers should consider the abolition of 
extraterritoriality after the most important highlighted issues had been resolved by the 
Chinese government. The commission also emphasized that the abolishment could be 
carried out partially over time in coherence with the Chinese progress. The commission 
also recommended the treaty powers to do the following, whilst all nations awaited the 
abolition of the extraterritoriality:    
1. The treaty powers should attempt to adopt the Chinese laws and regulations that 
they deemed applicable.   
2. The mixed courts248 should as a general rule, be tested before the westernized 
Chinese courts.   
3. The treaty powers should correct the maltreatment that had arisen through the 
extension of extraterritoriality to the Chinese as well as to Chinese owned 
businesses and shipping interests. The treaty powers should also require 
compulsory periodical registration of their nationals in China.  
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4. Necessary judicial assistance should be made available between the authorities 
of China and the treaty powers, and also between the treaty powers themselves. 
5. The citizens of the treaty powers should be required to pay the mandatory taxes 
and regulations that were put in motion by the Chinese authorities.249  
 
These five clauses reveal that the Commission on Extraterritoriality called for a gradual 
abolition of foreign extraterritoriality in China. It is also clear that the commission did not 
only point out the flaws of the Chinese judicial system, but also the faults found in the 
practice of foreign extraterritorially. The commission further called for that all powers 
should comply with the mandatory Chinese taxes and regulations. At the very end of the 
summary one finds that Johan Michelet was among the representatives who signed the 
commission’s joint declaration that took place on the 16th of September 1926.  Kayaoğlu 
highlights that the creation of the Commission on Extraterritoriality displays that the 
treaty powers as a group demanded reorganization of the Chinese legal code.250 He 
continues by stressing that after the commission had examined the Chinese legal codes, 
courts and prisons, it had concluded that the Chinese government lacked the 
institutional structure to protect the individual and property rights. Therefore it called for 
China continuing its reforms to institutionalize a state-based legal system before 
extraterritoriality could be removed.251      
 
 4.7 Chapter Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined how the Norwegian diplomats reasoned for why they 
believed it was advisable for Norway to adhere to the Eight-Power Resolution and 
participate on the Commission on Extraterritoriality. It has explored how their reasoning 
ultimately led to Norway adhering to the Eight-Power Resolution and participating on the 
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Commission on Extraterritoriality. Furthermore, that the reason for why Norway did so 
was not because it would enjoy much influence over the commission, but because it was 
vital to show the world that the Kingdom of Norway was among the nations that made 
the decisions. We have investigated how Norway’s need for international recognition 
convinced the Norwegian government to make a full political turnabout and accede to 
the Eight-Power Resolution in spite of it being a rather costly venture. The sources 
suggest that the Norwegian diplomats also knew that the Nationalists were on the rise in 
China rapidly gaining new ground and popular support. It was therefore important to 
make Norway seem as peaceful and friendly-minded as possible towards the Chinese 
people. In doing so, Norway would not be considered neither by the Chinese nor by its 
own people to be among the expansionist orientated imperialistic states. A Norwegian 
participation on the commission would also demonstrate for the other treaty power 
nations, as well as for China, that Norway considered extraterritoriality to be a matter of 
importance. We have also looked into how the diplomats’ views were consistent with 
Halvard Leira’s concept of Norwegian status seeking. The matter of status was also 
important when the Norwegian diplomats discussed who was going to be the Norwegian 
representative to the Commission on Extraterritoriality. The sources suggest that the 
financial expenses were Norway’s primary concern when deciding on its delegate. 
Lastly, We have briefly addressed the most significant declarations and 
recommendations that were proclaimed by the Commission on Extraterritoriality in 
regards to the abolishment of foreign extraterritoriality. Furthermore, how the 
commission stressed how the treaty powers needed to subject their citizens to Chinese 
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Chapter V 
Nationalist China's Campaign against 
Norwegian Extraterritoriality  
 
 5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined how and why Norway adhered to the Eight-Power 
Resolution in 1925, and thereby participated on the Commission on Extraterritoriality the 
following year. This chapter will continue by examining how the Chinese Nationalists 
reasserted the potential removal of the foreign privileges after they seized power in 
China, and how Norway reacted to these new attempts will be examined. This adheres 
to the research question highlighted in chapter one because it will investigate Norway’s 
role in the extraterritoriality discourse after the Chinese Nationalists seized powers over 
China in 1928. Hence the primary sub-research question for this chapter is: 1) how and 
why did the Norwegian diplomats respond to the Chinese Nationalists’ campaign 
to abolish the foreign privileges after they seized power over China in 1928?  In 
answering this question, we will need to briefly highlight the political consequences after 
the Chinese Nationalists seized power and look into how they attempted to remove 
extraterritoriality. We will then move on to address how the Nationalists succeeded in 
annulling the foreigners' tariff privileges. This requires looking into the events that 
ultimately ended in forming new treaties between China and the treaty power states. 
Another topic in this chapter is how Norwegian extraterritoriality was brought up and 
questioned in the Norwegian parliament. Therefore we will explore an interpellation from 
1927,252 asked by the Norwegian communist Ingvald Berentin Aase, (1882-1948) that 
questioned Norwegian extraterritoriality, by looking into this question: 2) how and why 
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was Norwegian extraterritoriality in China brought up and questioned in Aase's 
interpellation to the Norwegian parliament? The reason why this chapter is dedicated 
to these two topics is because this portrays how the Norwegian discourse regarding 
extraterritoriality changed after the Chinese Nationalists seized power over China in 
1928. 
 
 5.2 The Consequences of the Nationalists' Rise to Power 
 
The political landscape in China during the late 1920s changed profoundly, many 
historians have classified this as the start of the "Nanjing decade". Mackerras’ defines 
the Nanjing Decade as the time period from when the Chinese Nationalists made 
Nanjing China’s new Capital in 1927 until the Japanese invasion of China in 1937.253 
However, it was not before 1928, when the Nationalists had succeeded in reunifying 
China under their rule that they started to confront the foreign privileges in China. 
Therefore the focus of this chapter will be on the events that happened after 1928. Even 
though the Nationalists achieved sizing power over China, this did not bring a sudden 
end to all of the country's prior internal struggles.254 Kayaoğlu highlights that the 
Nationalists initiated a series of state-building projects and reforms. In doing so they 
attempted vast, yet incomplete endeavors to westernize and centralize China’s 
administration. He emphasizes that it was also during this period that the Nationalists 
revised the earlier Chinese drafted legal codes as well as compiled new ones.255 He also 
clarifies that the Nationalists’ success cannot be explained by their advanced ideas 
about reforming China, but rather by their martial success in establishing a central 
government that permitted the sustaining of their state building projects.256 Westad 
underlines that the Nationalist government during the Nanjing Decade became the most 
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effective government to rule China since the mid-nineteenth century.257 He further 
highlights how the Nationalists achieved an impressive economic growth through their 
time in power in spite of the struggling world economy at the time.258    
Mackerras highlights that there were still many influential warlords throughout China who 
organized several uprisings against the Nationalists throughout their time in power.259 
Furthermore, Japan had demonstrated a growing interest and influence over China, and 
thus became an increasing concern for the new Nanjing based government. In addition 
to these challenges, the Nationalists also faced a devastating ongoing civil war against 
the Chinese Communists. The rivalry between the Nationalists and the Communists 
occurred after the Nationalists firmly ended their former cooperation by initiating a violent 
purge against Communist leaders. Spence underlines that the suppression initiated by 
the Nationalists against the Communists ultimately marked the beginning of the Chinese 
Civil War.260  
 
 5.3  The Interpellation in the Norwegian Parliament 
 
This thesis has until now primarily addressed the events that took place in China and the 
correspondence that was sent from Norwegian diplomats who were stationed there. I will 
now shift my focus to an interpellation that was addressed to the Norwegian parliament 
on the 6th of May 1927. 261 This interpellation directly questioned the Norwegian use of 
extraterritoriality in China and was brought up by a representative of the Norwegian 
Communist Party named Ingvald Berentin Aase.262 It is likely that Aase had sympathetic 
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feelings towards his fellow communists in China and wanted to offer them support in 
their struggle against imperialism.  
The original wording of the interpellation that Aase wanted to bring up in the Norwegian 
parliament highlighted two different questions. Firstly, if parliament was aware that 
Norway had treaties with China that were based upon inequality. Aase also stressed that 
these treaties made Norway join the ranks of the imperialistic states that violated China’s 
sovereignty. Secondly, whether the Norwegian government was prepared to recognize 
the Chinese Nationalist government and relinquish the treaty that secured Norwegian 
citizens special privileges in China.263     
Aase started his interpellation addressing his first question by stating that his party could 
not ignore the interests that tied the European and Asian workers together. Therefore he 
argued that the European workers needed to help the Chinese workers in their struggle 
against oppression. He further emphasized that the Chinese had started to organize 
labor unions to fight for their rights. He continued by accentuating that their campaign for 
justice had been suppressed by British and Japanese imperialist interests. He further 
emphasized that the question regarding the abolishment of extraterritoriality was a 
crucial topic for the Chinese in their struggle for sovereignty.264  
The injustice regarding China's non-autonomous tariff-service was also something that 
Aase brought up, and he called for the ending of the practice. Aase also highlighted the 
issue regarding Norwegian extraterritoriality. While doing so, Aase underlined the 
unfairness that surrounded extraterritoriality, and he asked the representatives present if 
they would not have protested if such unfairness had unfolded itself in Norway. Aase 
even underlined the unjust practices performed by the foreigners and pointed to that 
there were localities in China where the Chinese were banned from entering. This 
suggests that Aase questioned Norwegian extraterritoriality on ideological and moral 
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grounds. Nonetheless, it seems that his primary focus was to offer his fellow 
communists the support he could give in their struggle against imperialism.  
Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers in the Nationalist party had in April 
1927 organized a purge against the Chinese communists known as the Shanghai 
Massacre.265 This event had alarmed the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. 
However, Mackarras highlights that even this brutal incident was not enough to make 
the Chinese Communists end their cooperation with the whole of the Nationalist party. 
Instead they firmly opposed Chiang Kai-shek's rightwing-clique within the Nationalist 
party.266 Aase also mentioned how Chiang Kai-shek's rightwing-clique had allegedly 
betrayed the trust given to them by the Chinese working class. This shows that this 
incident had caused Aase to cease his former support to Chiang Kai-shek and his 
followers. This suggests that the only reason for why Aase had supported Chiang Kai-
shek in the first place, was because of his former alliance with the Chinese Communist. 
Aase further claimed that Chiang Kai-shek had been bribed by the capitalists and 
imperialists to betray his former allies.267 Therefore Aase had changed his mind and did 
not any longer want Norway to recognize the Nationalist Government that was led by 
Chiang Kai-shek's rightwing-clique. This shows that Aase was aware of the animosity 
between the former two allies in China.  
The Norwegian Prime Minister at the time, Ivar Lykke,268 made a reply in which he 
stated that the Norwegian government did not wish to answer or discuss this 
interpellation due to the obscurity that surrounded the political state of affairs in China. 
The parliament then agreed unanimously to forward the interpellation to be evaluated by 
the Standing Committee on Foreign Relations and Constitutional Affairs.269 The 
parliamentary report named: innst. S. nr. 133 - 1927 then confirmed that the committee 
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did evaluate Aase's interpellation on the 2th of June 1927. In doing so the committee 
concluded by making a proposal that the Norwegian parliament should not process 
Aase's request. 270 
The Committee's proposal was made known in the Norwegian parliament on June 10. 
1927. Aase then commented that he was deeply disappointed with the committee’s 
decision to not even forward his request to the Norwegian government. Aase also 
brought up that despite all their internal disputes, the Chinese still agreed on one thing, 
and that was that extraterritoriality needed to be removed. Aase further stressed that he 
was sure that the question regarding extraterritoriality would be enforced sooner rather 
than later. Aase also emphasized that he believed that his fellow Norwegians, who 
probably possessed stronger nationalistic feelings than most other peoples, would 
sympathize with the Chinese peoples' nationalistic struggles. Nevertheless, the 
Norwegian parliament voted for the Committee's proposal.271 In doing so, parliament 
deemed Aase's proposal to be an issue that was not needed to be further addressed. 
This reveals the Norwegian parliament’s unwillingness to even address any of the 
Chinese requests at least not before they knew more about the political state of affairs in 
China. Furthermore, Norway had a conservative government at the time; this detail may 
explain why parliament was so persistent in keeping the status quo regarding 
extraterritoriality. The Norwegian historian Odd-Bjørn Fure underlines that the main 
focus of the Norwegian Conservative Party was to strengthen the Norwegian presence 
in international trade.272 While the emerging Norwegian Labor Party, just like the 
Norwegian Communist Party, had embraced the Marxist goal to end the capitalistic 
system of production, and thus the two were strongly opposed to the market economy 
and wanted to redirect Norway towards a socialistic oriented economy.273 Since 
furthering Norwegian participation in international trade was a major objective for the 
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Norwegian Conservative Party, it would have been surprising if they had supported the 
removal of extraterritoriality in China which Norwegian traders living there felt was a 
necessary basis for their personal security and economic interests.   
 
 5.4 The Making of the Sino-Norwegian Tariff Treaty of 1928   
 
It was not only the Eight-Power Resolution which brought up and sought to address the 
issues surrounding foreign privileges in China. Another related agreement was signed 
during the Washington Conference. This resolution from the 6th of February 1922 titled 
the Revision of Chinese Customs Tariff called for the treaty powers revising the Chinese 
custom duties.274 The resolution also permitted other treaty powers, such as Norway, to 
adhere to the treaty, something which Norway did on the 17th of September 1925. By 
doing so Norway agreed to be among the participating states in the upcoming Chinese 
Tariff Conference.275 I will only briefly address this conference since it did not deal with 
the abolishment of extraterritoriality in an explicit way. Nevertheless, the conference 
called for the end of the foreigners’ tariff privileges, something which laid the foundation 
for the tariff treaties between China and the treaty powers. This fact makes the Chinese 
Tariff Conference relevant enough to briefly look into, since it was a part of the chain of 
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 5.4.1 The Chinese Tariff Conference  
 
The Chinese Tariff Conference met in Beijing on the 26th of October 1925.276 Generally, 
the conference can be divided into two phases, in which the first that lasted until 
November 19, dealt with the issues surrounding China’s tariff autonomy. Thereafter the 
discussion shifted to address the surtax on imported goods. However, the focus of this 
study entails that only the first of these two phases will be examined. This is due to that 
both the foreign tariff privileges and extraterritoriality were benefits that the foreigners in 
China enjoyed, and which the Chinese wanted to end. Hence extraterritoriality and the 
foreign tariff autonomy can be considered as two sides of the same coin.  
The historian Shizhang Hu in his book Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy, 
1919-1937 (1995) states that the American delegates present at the conference 
disagreed on whether or not they should grant the Chinese their wishes of acquiring full 
tariff autonomy. However, he underlines that the American delegates rather wanted to 
abolish their tariff privileges than their extraterritoriality. Consequently, by granting the 
Chinese full autonomy in regards to the tariff, this could temporarily prevent them from 
also requesting the abolishment of extraterritoriality. However, Hu underlines that the 
Chinese still had to drive a hard barging during the conference to acquire their full tariff 
autonomy.277 He stresses how the Chinese Nationalists during the conference's 
negotiations had declared that they did not recognize any treaties made between the 
Beiyang government and the treaty powers. Furthermore, Hu states that the conference 
adjourned without that any formal treaty having been made. However, he also mentions 
that even though the conference itself had failed, the tables for the interim taxes that 
were discussed during the conference would later become the basis of the autonomous 
Chinese tariff schedule.278 
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 5.4.2 The Sino-Norwegian Tariff Treaty of 1928  
 
The questions regarding the Chinese tariff endured until the Nationalists took over 
Beijing in 1928. Wang highlights that the removal of the Unequal Treaties was a hot 
topic for the new Nationalist party.279 She further states that the Nationalists actively 
used and evolved the term Unequal Treaties and promised to vigorously push for their 
removal.280    
Arthur N. Young, who worked as a financial advisor to the Nationalist government, 
clarified that the Nationalists changed the Chinese strategy regarding how to regain full 
tariff autonomy after they seized power.281 Young explained that the Nationalists’ new 
tactic was to address the powers individually instead of collectively.282 In doing so they 
started off by addressing the United States, since the Americans had earlier displayed 
the most cooperativeness towards China's previous requests. Young showed that a new 
tariff treaty between the United States and China was agreed upon on the 25th of June 
1928. Young further mentioned that one of the main struggles during the negotiations 
was to keep equal American rights in China without using the wording "most favored 
nation" since China objected to its usage. The reason for this objection was because the 
Chinese connected the phrase with China’s national humiliation. Young continued by 
highlighting that the phrase was then edited to "in no way discriminatory" that legally 
meant exactly the same but also avoided insulting the Chinese.283 Wang underlines that 
the negations then resulted in the two countries agreeing that the United States would 
continue to enjoy extraterritoriality in exchange for American recognition of China’s tariff 
autonomy.284 Wang continues by affirming that the other treaty powers quickly followed 
the American example and signed new tariff treaties with China the following months.285 
This meant that the Chinese Nationalists had managed to restore one of China's 
aspirations within a relatively short period after their seizure of power.  
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The Sino-Norwegian Tariff Treaty of November 12 1928286 is a nearly identical copy of 
the Sino-American treaty287 that was signed the previous month. This treaty was the first 
bilateral agreement between Norway and China since initial treaty between the two from 
1847.288 The Sino-Norwegian tariff treaty affirmed China's tariff autonomy in exchange 
for Norway not going to be treated unfairly compared to other countries. The treaty 
further revealed that it was Nicolai Aall who represented Norway and signed the treaty 
together with the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Zhengting, (also known as: 
C. T. Wang289).290 Furthermore, by signing the treaty Norway did not only recognize 
China's tariff autonomy, but this treaty may also be considered as Norway's de facto 
recognition of Nationalist China. The Norwegian ratification of the Sino-Norwegian Tariff 
Treaty is confirmed in the parliamentary report named: innst. S. nr. 122 - 1929.291 This 
document confirms that Norway had ratified the new tariff treaty with China by royal 
resolution from February, 15. 1929 and that the new treaty was going to take effect on 
the first of March the same year. The reason for why Norway signed the treaty with 
China was because Norway, like all the other treaty powers, was quick to follow the 
American example. This shows that China's new strategy to address the treaty powers 
one by one instead of having joint discussions, had proved a successful venture. 
Norway was likely also satisfied with this arrangement since it kept the nation’s 
extraterritoriality in exchange for renouncing its tariff privileges. 
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 5.5 China’s New Abolition-Campaign against Extraterritoriality  
 
The Nationalists quickly readdressed the question regarding extraterritoriality after they 
had successfully acquired full Chinese tariff autonomy. It was important for the 
Nationalists to have something to show the public that gained them prestige and popular 
support. Accordingly, the success in regaining full tariff autonomy had been important for 
the Nationalists in securing the support of the Chinese public. The removal of foreign 
extraterritoriality was equally important for them to achieve. Hence Wang Zhengting 
initiated a new campaign against foreign extraterritoriality during the late 1920s. As a 
result, Norway was sent two letters in the course of 1929 in which China requested that 
Norway relinquished its extraterritoriality. 
 
 5.5.1 The Norwegian Strategy Regarding Extraterritoriality 
 
It is important to understand to what extent the Norwegian diplomats argued that 
Norwegian interests in China would suffer if extraterritoriality was to be abolished, before 
starting to explore the two letters that Zhengting Wang sent to Norway. This issue was 
brought up in a letter that was written by Nicolai Aall on February 22, 1927 addressed to 
the Norwegian Legation in Beijing.292 This letter is significant not only because it 
highlighted how Nicolai Aall argued that Norwegian interests would be affected if 
extraterritoriality was removed, but more importantly because Aall also claimed that he 
underlined his personal opinions on extraterritoriality. This is significant because Nicolai 
Aall led much of the Norwegian negotiations with China regarding Norwegian 
extraterritoriality. Therefore his personal views on the matter are of major importance 
when examining the negotiations and their results.  
This letter was sent from Nicolai Aall to the Norwegian Legation in Beijing as a response 
to the legation's earlier inquiry about which consequences the abolishment of 
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extraterritoriality would bring about for Norway. Aall highlighted his own views on the 
continuance of Norwegian extraterritoriality. In doing so he reaffirmed his words from the 
correspondence that he sent to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign affairs on the 10th of 
February 1922.293 He emphasized that all the issues he had brought up in this 
correspondence were still valid. However, he also underlined that Norway evidently 
needed to follow the example of the other treaty powers if they decided to end their 
extraterritoriality. Yet, Aall argued that Norway should keep its extraterritoriality for as 
long as diplomatically possible. He further underlined that he believed that Norwegian 
interests in China would suffer if extraterritoriality was to be removed. Nevertheless, Aall 
also added that Norwegians had generally not invested much in China, and therefore 
the Norwegian interests there as a whole were small compared to other treaty powers. 
However, Aall also underlined that there were some exceptions. These were primarily 
the Norwegian paper export to China and the Norwegian shipping industry in East Asia. 
Aall also brought attention to the fact that Norwegian missionaries had invested a 
significant amount of wealth in China. Nevertheless, Aall concluded that Norway would 
generally not suffer as much as the other treaty powers that had invested more heavily 
in China, if extraterritoriality was abolished.  
This source suggests that the general views of Norwegian diplomats on extraterritoriality 
had not shifted as result of the Nationalists having gained power in China. However, 
since they were still fully benefitting from extraterritoriality, and therefore might be 
considered as stakeholders, this makes their status quo position no surprise. They 
argued that extraterritoriality was still a vital requirement for the Norwegian economic 
interests as well as for the wellbeing of Norwegian citizens residing in China. Even so it 
seems like the diplomats acknowledged the slight shift in international opinion 
concerning extraterritoriality. They were fully aware of that Norway, as a small nation, 
was diplomatically obliged to follow the great powers initiative in this matter. Any other 
action would be in severe conflict with the general Norwegian foreign policy at the time 
that emphasized the importance close ties to Britain.  
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 5.5.2 Nationalist China’s First Note to Norway  
 
In coherence with the Nationalists' new campaign against foreign extraterritoriality, 
Zhengting Wang sent an official request to Nicolai Aall on the 27th of April 1929.294 The 
essence of this letter was that the Chinese government called for Norway as soon as 
possible to abolish its extraterritoriality. Wang started off by emphasizing that a new era 
of friendly relations between China and Norway had dawned through the reunification of 
China under a new solid government. He further added that this friendly attitude had 
been displayed when the two countries agreed to sign the new tariff treaty. He also 
underlined that the Chinese government wanted to accelerate the new friendship by 
readjusting extraterritoriality to be based solely upon equality. Wang also emphasized 
China’s eternal gratefulness towards Norway if the Norwegians fulfilled this request. He 
also stressed how this action would end another inconvenient obstacle that stood in the 
way of a complete cooperation between the two countries.   
He then claimed that extraterritoriality was only a legacy of China's old regime. He 
further underlined how extraterritoriality was slowing down China's progress into 
international society. He also mentioned the importance of how the close contact 
between China and the foreign powers had led to a rapid assimilation of western legal 
concepts into the Chinese legal system. He further stressed how the new Chinese civil 
and commercial codes were going to be put into circulation before the first of January 
1930.  
Wang also attempted to assure Aall that all the powers that had ceased to benefit from 
extraterritoriality had found satisfaction in the protection the Chinese laws had given 
their nationals. For this reason he claimed that no one would be unfavorably affected if 
they relinquished their extraterritoriality. Wang ended his letter by stressing that the 
Chinese government deeply desired to have extraterritoriality abolished at the earliest 
possible date. For this reason he wished that all the treaty power nations would take 
China's request into immediate and sympathetic consideration.   
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5.5.3 The Norwegian Reaction to China’s First Note 
 
Wang's request was brought up in a letter that was written on the 6th of May 1929 that 
was sent from the Norwegian Consulate General in Shanghai to the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 295 This unsigned letter started off by assuming that the Ministry had 
already received a copy of Wang's note from the 27th of April. It also mentioned how the 
American, British, Dutch, Brazilian and French diplomats had received similar notes. The 
author stated that the reason for why the Chinese had only contacted these six treaty 
powers was because the other powers had already vaguely accepted to renounce their 
extraterritoriality by the first of January 1930. However, this acceptance was on the 
condition that the details surrounding the abolition were agreed upon in a later treaty. 
The author further mentioned how Switzerland had agreed to relinquish its 
extraterritoriality in its treaty with China from 1918. However, this was on the condition 
that it would not happen before the other treaty powers did the same. Therefore the 
author believed that the Chinese were satisfied with this arrangement and thereby 
considered it superfluous to send any further requests to the Swiss. 
The author further clarified that he did not yet know how the other powers were going to 
respond to Wang's note. However, he decided to second the words Nicolai Aall wrote 
after he had settled the conditions of the Sino-Norwegian Tariff Treaty of 1928. Aall had 
then expressed his confidence in that the Norwegian government would know when the 
time was right to reevaluate the treaty with China from 1847. However, the author also 
stressed that the reassessment should only be decided upon when Norway fully knew 
how the other treaty powers' decided to respond to the request. He further added that he 
believed that it was advisable to send a vague, but friendly answer that could temporarily 
satisfy the Chinese.   
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More information on how the Norwegian diplomats discussed the Chinese request is 
revealed in a confidential letter written to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.296 
This letter was written in Beijing on the 15th of May 1929 by Kaare Ingstad, an attaché 
(the lowest rank of the regular diplomats)297 in service in the Norwegian legation from 
1927 to 1933.298 Ingstad notified the Ministry that the reason for why it was he and not 
Nicolai Aall who wrote the letter, was Aall's absence from Beijing at the time. Ingstad 
begun the letter by affirming that the request that the Chinese foreign minister had sent 
to Norway and the other five treaty powers on the 27th of April, in no way came as a 
surprise. He highlighted that the Chinese minister in Washington already in February 
had sent a similar request to the American Department of State. Ingstad underlined how 
the request had been declined by the Department after it had consulted the 
governments of the other treaty powers. Ingstad further emphasized that the Chinese 
campaign against extraterritoriality had been temporarily set aside until the Chinese 
government’s assembly in March 1929. He explained that the Chinese government 
during its meeting then had congratulated Zhengting Wang on his success in acquiring 
the new tariff treaties for China, and had encouraged him to carry on his effort. Ingstad 
further highlighted how he believed that the Nationalist government attempted every 
measure that would at least temporarily silence the radicals within their own 
government.  
Ingstad also drew attention to the fact that most of the other treaty powers had 
forwarded the Chinese note to their governments. He stressed that he believed that the 
powers would then jointly turn down the request in a forthcoming and understanding 
manner. Ingstad also brought up the possibility that Japan could obtain leadership over 
the treaty power's joint policy concerning extraterritoriality in China. He then underlined 
how Japan could declare to relinquish their extraterritoriality, but only if the other treaty 
powers did the same. 
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Ingstad highlighted how the British, the Americans, the Dutch and the French had 
already met and jointly discussed the Chinese request. They had then concluded that 
they would answer the Chinese with identical notes. Ingstad further underlined that when 
he had asked them about why Norway and Brazil had not been invited, they had 
responded that the meeting had been private. This suggests that these significant treaty 
powers did not consider it necessary to include neither Norway nor Brazil into their joint 
meeting. This is likely because they were relatively sure that both Norway and Brazil 
would follow in their initiative. Therefore they might have considered it superfluous to 
include these two nations that were likely to tag along in any case.   
Ingstad concluded the letter by affirming that he had strong reasons to believe that the 
powers would demand hard facts from China in regard to how they practiced their 
jurisdiction before they would abolish their extraterritoriality, which in his belief was the 
exact opposite of what they had done during the tariff negotiations when they had blindly 
trusted China's promises. Ingstad also stressed that the Norwegian role would likely be 
similar to what it was during the tariff treaty negotiations; namely, to await and see what 
the great powers' decided to do. However, he also underscored that this could be tough 
because of the secrecy that surrounded their meetings. 
This source further puts an emphasis on the Norwegian role as a minor nation among 
the treaty powers. Hence the source suggests how the diplomats believed that it was 
important that Norway awaited how the great powers were going to respond before 
doing anything significantly. This action would also be consistent with the Norwegian 
foreign policy of the time that emphasized the necessity of having close diplomatic ties 
to Great Britain. By awaiting Britain’s response, Norway would not risk to anger the 
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5.5.4 Nationalist China’s Second Note to Norway 
 
Zhengting Wang sent a follow-up note on behalf of the Chinese government to Nicolai 
Aall on the 12th of September 1929.299 He began with affirming that he had received 
Aall's note of August 14,300 in which Aall had transmitted the views held by the 
Norwegian government regarding extraterritoriality. Wang reemphasized in a diplomatic 
manner how the Chinese government was pleased with the friendly attitude Norway had 
displayed towards China through the signing of the new tariff treaty. However, he 
continued by stressing that Norway now had another opportunity to demonstrate its 
friendship towards China by relinquishing its extraterritoriality. He also emphasized that 
the Norwegian government needed to realize that there was no longer a need for 
extraterritoriality in China. Therefore Wang urged the Norwegian government to enter 
into immediate discussions with the Chinese and initiate the arrangements required to 
abolish extraterritoriality.  
This source reveals that Norway did send a vague, yet forthcoming response to the first 
request from the Chinese. However, the source shows that China was not satisfied with 
the Norwegian response of the 14th of August and wanted something more specific and 
binding. It is likely that the reason for this was that Zhengting Wang knew very well how 
Western diplomats often utilized a rather vague and ambiguous diplomatic language to 
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5.5.5 The Norwegian Reaction to China’s Second Note 
 
A new Norwegian discussion regarding extraterritoriality was initiated after Zhengting 
Wang had sent his second note to Norway. The fresh Norwegian approach is revealed 
in the letter Nicolai Aall wrote on the 2th of October 1929 that was addressed to the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.301 Aall started off this letter by highlighting that the 
ministers from the countries that had been contacted by the Chinese had now 
collectively met to discuss the Chinese request. This detail shows a significant contrast 
to the earlier Norwegian situation. Norway had now been invited to participate along with 
the other treaty powers that earlier preferred to discuss the matter in secrecy. This 
suggests that Nicolai Aall took matters into his own hands when he returned to Beijing 
and used his diplomatic influence to join the group. This accomplishment was likely 
much easier for Aall to achieve than what it had been for Ingstad. This was perhaps 
because Ingstad was only an attaché at the time and lacked the diplomatic ranking, 
influence and experience that Aall possessed. Furthermore, the earlier mentioned 
biographical register: Men of Shanghai and North China highlighted that Aall in 1933 
(when it was written) was one of the oldest foreign consular officials in North China.302 
He thereby had useful networks and prior knowledge of the rules and norms of the 
diplomatic game in China. This suggests that Aall at the time enjoyed a seniority status 
among the other foreign consuls in China. This being the case suggests that it could not 
have been very difficult for Aall to secure himself a seat among the other diplomats who 
discussed how to respond to the Chinese requests.   
By participating Aall also managed to inform the Ministry about what the other treaty 
powers were planning to do. The summarized version was that they wanted to make 
China send more concrete suggestions for dialogue and in doing so they attempted to 
drag out the issue. However, Aall also underlined in the letter that they all agreed that it 
was crucial to answer the Chinese request before the Chinese used their silence as an 
excuse to abolish extraterritoriality altogether by the first of January 1930. He also 
highlighted how he had suggested to the other diplomats that they should jointly draw 
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attention to the recent cases of piracy that had occurred along the Chinese coast, and 
use these as an example for why China was not capable to protect the lives and 
property of its foreign residents.303  
Aall also suggested that he believed that the reason for why the Nationalists wanted to 
press for the abolition of extraterritorially was to regain some of their lost prestige in the 
eyes of the Chinese public. He further highlighted how the Nationalists had struggled 
with several recent adversities. Some examples that Aall mentioned were how a 
Chinese province had declared its independence from the Nationalists as well as how 
China had lost the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute304 to the Soviet Union in 1929. 
Westad even underlines that this conflict ultimately ended all of the Chinese Nationalist 
former ties with the Soviets.305 
More information is revealed in a letter that Nicolai Aall wrote on the 14th of October 
1929 that was addressed to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.306 In this letter 
Aall mentioned the draft reply that the diplomats from the treaty powers that had been 
contacted by the Chinese, had discussed. Aall highlighted that the British strategically 
decided not to mention the recent pirate attacks on foreign interests as a reason to 
doubt the Chinese guarantees of protection. Aall explained that the reasoning for this 
was because they believed that such a move could weaken the overall cause since they 
already had brought up plenty of reasons for postponing the abolition of 
extraterritoriality. Aall further highlighted that he had told the other diplomats that 
Norwegian citizens had recently been attacked by Chinese pirates, and therefore it was 
possible that Norway wanted to bring this up in its reply.   
Aall also clarified in the letter that he had told the other diplomats that Norway in an 
earlier note to China, had declared that the Norwegian government did not want to 
maintain extraterritoriality longer than it deemed necessary; whereby China had bluntly 
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answered that extraterritoriality was not needed anymore. Aall also mentioned that he 
believed the extraterritoriality negotiations between China and the treaty powers were far 
from over.  Nevertheless, a mutual understanding between China and Norway was in 
fact agreed on during the next few years, something that happened in spite of Aall’s 
prediction. Hence we will now move on and examine this highly relevant agreement.  
 
 5.6 The Agreement between China and Norway 
 
It is important to highlight some major events that occurred in China at the time when 
Norway came to a new agreement with China regarding its extraterritoriality. Westad 
explains why the Nationalists did not go through with their attempts to unilaterally abolish 
all of the unequal treaties by the first of January 1930. He clarifies that the reason why 
the Nationalists did so cannot only be explained because of the West’s unwillingness to 
negotiate with them. In fact Westad underlines that the most significant factor for why 
the Nationalists changed their mind was because of the growing threat of war with 
Japan.307 He continues by stressing that during the early 1930s it had become evident 
that Japanese expansionism could not coexist with Chinese nationalism.308 Westad 
further explains that the Japanese staged “Mukden Incident”309 had resulted in 
Manchuria being seized by Japanese forces in 1931. He continues by stressing how the 
Chinese Nationalists considered Manchuria to be an unchallengeable part of China. 
However, the Nationalists were lacking both international support and military power to 
fight Japan outright. Hence Westad concludes that the Nationalists knew that China’s 
survival depended on postponing the inevitable war with Japan.310 Dong Wang also 
highlights how the Mukden Incident bluntly ended all the ongoing negotiations between 
the Chinese and the British Empire, the United States and Japan. She continues by 
underlining that on December 29, 1931 the Chinese also announced to suspend its 
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previous declaration from two years earlier that revoked extraterritoriality.311 With this 
historical context in mind we can move on to examining the negotiations between China 
and Norway.  
Much information about the discussions between China and Norway is disclosed in a 
letter written on the 30th of January 1931 addressed to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs from Ludvig Aubert.312 Ludvig Aubert was a Norwegian diplomat who worked in 
East-Asia from 1929 to 1935 as a “Sendemann”313 (a permanent leader for a diplomatic 
station).314 Aubert revealed in this letter that he and Zhengting Wang had met and 
discussed Norwegian extraterritoriality. Aubert had then explained to Wang that Norway 
had delayed it response to China due to the traditional Norwegian policy of having close 
diplomatic ties with Norway’s neighbors. These concerns had made Norway await its 
response until China had received a reply from countries like Great Britain. Aubert also 
revealed in the letter that the Norwegian government had requested that he offered the 
Chinese that Norway indeed did agree to abolish its extraterritoriality at the same time 
as the other treaty powers if the status quo regarding Norwegian extraterritoriality 
remained until that happened. Aubert then clarified that Wang had agreed to this 
proposal nearly without any hesitation. Wang had then informed Aubert that he would 
shortly make the necessary arrangement to establish the new agreement between 
China and Norway.  
This letter suggests that one important Norwegian concern regarding the continuance of 
extraterritoriality was not to do anything that could possibly upset the European great 
powers. It was especially important for Norway to always strive for good relations with 
Great Britain. Hence China's campaign against extraterritoriality was certainly not 
something that Norway was willing to risk its good relations with Great Britain for. That 
being said, I also believe that it was important for China to push the minor powers into 
relinquishing their extraterritoriality before the great powers. This was because nations 
such as Norway had generally small economic interests in China and thus they did not 
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have much to lose if they abolished their extraterritorially. However, if China managed to 
make new agreements with the smaller treaty powers, it could on a moral basis push the 
great powers to follow their examples and also relinquish their extraterritoriality.  
The Norwegian parliament briefly addressed the circumstances regarding Norwegian 
extraterritoriality in China on the 20th of February 1931.315 The report from this meeting 
states that negotiations between China and Norway regarding extraterritoriality had been 
going on for a while. The report also emphasised the Chinese declaration that 
announced that by the first of January 1930 all foreigners within China would be put 
under Chinese jurisdiction. However, the report also made clear that this ultimatum was 
not directly given to the treaty powers, and therefore it had been surrounded by many 
uncertainties. The negotiations between China and the treaty powers had therefore 
continued. The report also highlighted how the Chinese in December 1930 had sent a 
proposal regarding the abolishment of extraterritoriality to the Norwegian legation in 
Shanghai. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had then asked the legation to inform the 
Chinese that Norway was willing to relinquish its extraterritoriality, but not before the 
other treaty powers did the same. Until then, Norway desired to keep the status quo 
regarding its extraterritoriality in China. The report further underlined that the Chinese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Wang Zhengting) had agreed to such an arrangement.  
Aubert finally reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 28th of April 1931, that a 
new agreement had been made between Norway and China, in spite of some earlier 
minor disagreements regarding the new agreement's wording.316 Aubert also claimed 
that this agreement was as advantageous as possible for Norway, since Norway kept its 
extraterritoriality until the time the other treaty powers also agreed to abolish theirs. 
Therefore Aubert concluded that Norway did not any longer need to focus its attention 
on the discussions that regarded extraterritoriality. Norway could patiently await the 
agreements that China made with the remaining treaty powers while still enjoying its 
extraterritoriality. 
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This agreement put Norway into the same position as Switzerland had acquired more 
than a decade earlier in 1918. In doing so Norway had secured Chinese goodwill and 
gratitude in addition to keeping its extraterritorial privileges until the remaining foreign 
powers also agreed to abolish theirs. This was an advantageous position for Norway, 
since Norwegian citizens could continue to benefit from extraterritoriality without having 
to persist discussing, as well as justifying the matter to the Chinese. This arrangement 
was also favourable due to that the Norwegian foreign policy at the time which would 
likely have required Norway to follow the British example in any case regarding foreign 
extraterritoriality. Nevertheless, this arrangement meant that the extraterritoriality 
discourse for Norway’s part, came to a conclusion for now.  
Furthermore, this arrangement was also beneficial for China since it could focus its 
diplomatic attention even more on making the remaining treaty powers relinquish their 
extraterritoriality as well. The one possible disadvantage that this arrangement could 
entail was that the other treaty powers could feel that Norway opened a possibility for 
China to on a moral basis claim that the other treaty powers had to follow the Norwegian 
example. However, Aubert did not bring up this issue after having come to this 
agreement with China. This might have been because he desired to portray the 
agreement as beneficial as possible since he himself wanted to appear as being 
significant in the making of this advantageous agreement.   
 
 5.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we started off by exploring how the Norwegian parliament was not 
interested in discussing Aase’s interpellation that questioned the Norwegian practice of 
extraterritoriality. This interpellation was pushed aside by the Norwegian parliament due 
to the obscurity that surrounded the political state of affairs in China. This action 
demonstrated that the Norwegian parliament was not interested at all in discussing 
Norwegian extraterritoriality in China at the time. Further on we investigated how the 
His 350 Jens Tepstad 100 
 
Chinese Nationalists acquired new tariff treaties that returned full tariff autonomy to 
China. We explored how Norway, just like the other treaty powers, followed the 
American example and quickly returned the tariff autonomy to China. Then we looked 
into how one of the main reasons for why the Americans agreed to return full tariff 
autonomy to China, was because the United States deemed extraterritoriality more 
important to keep. We then shifted focus and researched the Nationalists' campaign 
against extraterritoriality. We explored how Norway reacted to China's new attempt to 
remove foreign extraterritoriality. Lastly we looked into how Norway and China jointly 
agreed to that Norway could keep its extraterritoriality until the day the other treaty 
powers also agreed to relinquish theirs. Thus Norway stepped aside from the 
extraterritoriality discussions while still benefitting from extraterritoriality, and it continued 
to observe the discussions from the sideline. This agreement is in many ways the 
answer that I have been looking for while researching this topic. Yet, Norwegian 
extraterritoriality continued to have effect for another decade. For this reason I will briefly 
examine the final causes that led up to Norway abolishing its extraterritoriality in the 
















6.1 The Second World War  
 
The mutual agreement between China and Norway ended the extraterritoriality debate 
for Norway's part. However, the debate continued between China and the remaining 
treaty powers states that had yet to give up on their extraterritoriality. Dong Wang 
highlights that even though the extraterritoriality discourse experienced a growing 
interest in both intellectual and popular circles during the years between 1930 and 1940, 
no breakthrough was made.317 I will therefore move forward in time to the most relevant 
circumstances that made Norway abolish its extraterritoriality in China. In doing so I will 
highlight the main political context that made Norway end its extraterritoriality in 1943, 
that evidently being the Second World War.    
Kayaoğlu highlights that the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 downgraded how 
China viewed the importance of the removal of extraterritoriality.318 The Japanese 
invasion had made China’s survival the first priority of its government. Westad 
underlines that the Japanese invasion led to that China not only gained extensive 
military support from the Soviet Union, but also the sympathy of the world.319 He also 
states that after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the 8th of December 1941, the 
Sino-American alliance developed rapidly.320  
Kayaoğlu highlights that it was surprisingly the British and Americans and not the 
Chinese that pressed for continuing the negotiations in the early 1940s. Yet, the United 
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States and Britain agreed that neither state would act alone on this issue.321 
Consequently, the two countries agreed to notify the Chinese government on October 
10, 1942, that they were prepared to abolish their extraterritoriality.322  
Kayaoğlu clarifies that this decision may be explained by two reasons. Firstly, the Allied 
policy makers were deeply interested in laying the foundation to a new postwar 
international world order. Secondly, they considered extraterritoriality to be outdated and 
archaic, and therefore it did not belong in this new world order. Hence Kayaoğlu 
suggests that this change of opinion on extraterritoriality indicates that a normative shift 
occurred on how the treaty powers perceived the system's appropriateness in the new 
postwar international system.323  
Nevertheless, the treaty that relinquished the American extraterritoriality was signed in 
Washington on January 11, 1943.324 The first article in this treaty declared that:     
“Nationals of the United States of America (…) shall be subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Government of the Republic of China in accordance with the principles of 
international law and practice.”325 
However, it was not only the United States that signed such a treaty with China on that 
day. The British did just like the Americans, agree to abolish their extraterritoriality as 
well on the very same day.326 In doing so, the two most significant Allied powers had 
agreed to end their extraterritoriality in China. It might be argued that part of the reason 
for why the British and the Americans abolished their extraterritoriality was because all 
three countries were parts of the Allies. However, Kayaoğlu claims that the reason for 
why the United States and Britain came to this decision was not because of their joint 
warfare with China against Japan. He supports this claim by highlighting that the 
wartime alliance between the Allies and China against Japan dates back to long before 
extraterritoriality was removed in 1943. He further stresses that the termination of 
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extraterritoriality was not needed to keep this alliance intact. Instead he emphasizes that 
the strategic reason that kept the alliance firm was their joint struggle to combat 
Japanese aggression.327 Hence Kayaoğlu rather gives credit to the paradigm shift that 
had occurred among British and American policy makers for finally terminating their 
extraterritoriality. It might be argued that part of the reason for this was that the anti-
imperialistic movements had gained increasing political credence within these two 
countries. This had in turn made them more understanding towards a universal right for 
sovereignty on state level.  
Yet, it can be argued that Kayaoğlu’s claim underestimates the strategic importance that 
such a gesture of goodwill demonstrated to China. By renouncing their extraterritoriality 
they ensured that China had regained one of its key aspirations that Chinese leaders 
had sought after for nearly a century. Thereby this gesture would surely reinforce 
Chinese morale, and encourage Chinese resistance against the Japanese aggression.  
 
 6.1.1 The Abolition of Norwegian Extraterritoriality in China 
 
The German occupation of Norway that had begun on the 9th of April 1940,328 had 
thrown Norway unwillingly into the Second World War on the Allies' side. The Norwegian 
government had fled to London and continued to manage the Norwegian resistance 
against the Axis powers from there. Hence the Norwegian and the Chinese governments 
were allied in a war against the Axis aggressors that had seized their territories.  
The Japanese decided in April 1942 to forcefully shut down the Norwegian Legation and 
Consulate-General in Shanghai because they represented the Norwegian government in 
London. This action ultimately resulted in another Norwegian legation being reopened 
the same year in China's wartime capital, Chongqing.329 It was therefore in Chongqing 
that the two countries agreed to abolish Norwegian extraterritoriality on November 10, 
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1943.330 This agreement was in no way a surprise since the one condition that Norway 
had required before it would abolish its extraterritoriality had been fulfilled earlier that 
year. Winning the war was also evidently Norway's primary objective and since both 
Norway and China were on the Allied side any other action would have been rather 
questionable. The ongoing world war and the fact that the Norwegian diplomatic 
presentence in Shanghai was relocated to Chongqing, are also the most likely reasons 
for why it took several months after both Britain and the United States had officially 
agreed to renounce their extraterritoriality, until Norway lived up to its promise to China 
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7. Concluding Remarks  
 
This thesis has examined how the continuance of the extraterritoriality discourse 
developed as well as how Norway participated in this process. The primary goal of this 
research has been to understand why Norway abolished its extraterritoriality in China in 
1943. I have therefore focused the research on the time period from when Norway 
attained diplomatic representation in the Chinese capital, Beijing, in 1919 until 
extraterritoriality was abolished in 1943. This investigation has been structured and 
divided into three analytical chapters that have chronologically explored this 
development from different angles. 
In the first analytical chapter we looked into how and why the Norwegian diplomats 
responded negatively to the outcome of the Eight-Power Resolution and argued for 
keeping extraterritoriality unchanged. We thereby explored which kinds of arguments the 
diplomats made for keeping the status quo regarding foreign extraterritoriality in China. 
We have also uncovered how the Norwegian diplomats argued that Chinese jurisdiction 
was incapable of protecting the foreigners and offer them fair judicial treatment. We 
have therefore also looked into how and why the Norwegian diplomats attempted to 
influence governmental colleagues at home to support their views on the continuance of 
extraterritoriality. The investigation has further shown why the diplomats claimed China 
to be incapable of handling the responsibilities the abolition of extraterritoriality would 
bring about. The diplomats' primary arguments were explored. We found that these 
arguments corresponded to the five necessities that Gerrit Gong argues that Westerners 
required China to fulfill before abolishing their extraterritoriality. We have also seen how 
the diplomats argued that the Chinese had only westernized their laws on paper, and 
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rarely practiced them. Hence we came to the conclusion that the Norwegian diplomats 
portrayed a worry that all foreigners would suffer under the Chinese jurisdiction if 
extraterritoriality was removed. It is also likely that the Norwegian diplomats who 
disagreed with the Eight-Power Resolution's outcome reflect the general view of the 
foreign population in China. Articles such as the one written by Rodney Gilbert, suggest 
that the consensus among the foreigners in China was to oppose the resolution. Hence 
British and American diplomats in China might have written letters of similar content to 
their colleagues with the same ulterior motives as we have found in the Norwegian 
letters examined in this research.  
In the next chapter we shifted focus and looked into how the Norwegian diplomats 
reasoned for why they believed it was desirable to make Norway adhere to the Eight-
Power Resolution and participate on the Commission on Extraterritoriality. We also saw 
how their arguments eventually made Norway adhere to the resolution and participate 
on the commission. We therefore also looked into how this action was consistent with 
Halvard Leira's concept of Norwegian status seeking. We discovered that Norway's 
campaign for status likely was an important factor for why it ended up participating on 
the commission. We saw that it was vital for Norway to show the world that it was among 
the decision-making nations in spite of not having much influence over the outcome of 
the commission.  Hence Norway's strife for international status was likely an influencing 
factor for why it joined this rather costly venture. We also saw that the Norwegian 
diplomats were well aware of the Chinese Nationalists’ rise to power. The diplomats tried 
to make Norway seem as friendly as possible to avoid making the Chinese associate 
them with imperialism. By taking part in the Commission on Extraterritoriality this would 
show other nations that the practice of extraterritoriality was an important matter that 
needed to be addressed. We also briefly looked into the commission’s most significant 
declarations, such as how it urged that the treaty powers needed to subject their citizens 
to Chinese taxes and regulations.    
In the final analytical chapter we discovered that the Norwegian parliament was not 
interested in addressing the issues surrounding Norwegian use of extraterritoriality in 
China in 1927. We saw that this was because parliament believed that the political 
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obscurity in China made the topic futile to discuss. We also investigated how the political 
landscape in China changed after the Nationalist sized power and how this political 
change ultimately led to new tariff treaties that returned full tariff autonomy to China. We 
explored how Norway, just like the other treaty powers, followed the American example 
and returned tariff autonomy to China. We also looked into how the main reason for why 
the United States agreed to this was because they considered extraterritoriality a more 
important privilege to keep. We saw how Norway reacted to Nationalist China's strategy 
to remove foreign extraterritoriality, which ultimately led to China agreeing to let Norway 
keep practicing its extraterritoriality until the day the other treaty powers agreed to 
surrender their rights. Norway then continued to only observe the ongoing talks from the 
sideline. 
This is in many ways the real answer to my research question in spite of the fact that 
Norway's extraterritoriality continued to have effect for another decade. Nevertheless, 
we confirmed in the historical epilogue that Norway lived up to the promise it had given 
China in 1931, since it agreed to abolish its extraterritoriality in China on the 10th of 
November 1943. This agreement was not a surprise because both Norway and China 
were parts of the Allies. It would be strange if Norway did not keep its promise to China 
when both countries were on the same side in the ongoing world war. Another key 
aspect for why Norway had been hesitant to outright end its extraterritoriality was 
because it had been afraid to anger Britain. One of most significant political contexts for 
Norway during this era, was to have as close political ties to Britain as diplomatically 
possible. Norway could at worst risk its good standing with Britain by angering them by 
starting a domino effect by abolishing its extraterritoriality which could potentially require 
Britain to do the same. Since Britain had invested heavily in China it was also likely to be 
more hesitant to abolish the judicial rights that legally protected its interests in the 
country. Hence the answer to this research may be seen as an example of Norway's 
foreign policy at the time. Since Britain had already abolished its extraterritoriality earlier 
in 1943, this worry was no longer relevant at the time. 
Summing up, the Norwegian participation in the extraterritoriality discourse during the 
timeframe of this study developed from one position into another. The Norwegian 
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position shifted from a rather fixed belief that extraterritoriality was a necessity to be kept 
in China in order to safeguard the lives and wellbeing of the Norwegians living there; into 
the position where it agreed to relinquish extraterritoriality when all other treaty power 
states did so as well. This development is mainly consistent with the long lines of 
Norway’s foreign policy during this timeframe. Norway was a state that looked to Britain 
as its lodestar in regards to its foreign policy. However, at the same time Norway wanted 
to strengthen international law and order to ensure the lawful protection of small 
countries from aggressor states. Norway also stressed its neutrality position during the 
interwar period and wanted to become a state to be reckoned with in international 
politics. This might be perceived as somewhat of a paradox; Norway wanted to be a self 
reliant political actor on the international scene, but at the same time Norway fell in line 
with the other treaty powers.  
Nonetheless, the Norwegian participation on the Commission on Extraterritoriality was 
an action in coherence with Norway’s status seeking project as well as with Norway’s 
belief in the premise that international law should be firm and protective towards the 
rights and sovereignty of the less powerful nations. The Sino-Norwegian Agreement of 
1931 fits into this premise simply by being made, but it also clearly linked to the 
Norwegian adhere to Britain in foreign matters, as Norway stated that it would not act 
independently, but wait until the other foreign powers had abolished their 
extraterritoriality before following suit.  
The outbreak of the Second World War shifted Norway from being a neutral state to 
being an occupied country with an exiled government in league with the Allies. Thus 
when the United States and Britain ended their extraterritoriality in China, Norway 
naturally followed their example.  
The shift in the international position on extraterritoriality, from seeing it as necessary 
provision to ensure the basic rights of property and safety for foreigners in China, to 
recognizing China’s full sovereignty over its foreigners in 1943 has been explained by 
different factors by different historians. The international situation in World War II with 
China being allied to the United States and Britain, has been put forward as a reason by 
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among others Westad.331 However, the normative shift pointing to that extraterritoriality 
“has no place in international law”332 is the premise that Kayaoğlu stresses. He 
accentuates that the United States and Britain did not abolish extraterritoriality in China 
to strengthen China against Japan. He states that the Chinese Nationalists in the 1930s 
had introduced legal reforms which were recognized by the United States and Britain, 
and that especially the United States was eager to establish a new world order after the 
world war that they excepted to win. Kayaoğlu shows that after the Second World War 
the United States has created new forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction which is more in 
coherence with the open liberal trading systems created by the Allies after the war.333   
Norway’s position towards the international shift on extraterritoriality was however, not 
being an active party. The outcome of Aase’s interpellation to the Norwegian parliament 
in 1927 suggests that the anti-imperialist sentiments were not very prominent among 
Norway’s political elite at the time. Even though we have seen that Norway did not want 
to be perceived as an imperialistic state by the Chinese, Norway did in these matters 
follow the larger foreign powers and the shift towards recognizing China’s right to 
sovereignty over all people living within its borders, came as part of the international shift 
towards this position. Actually some of the Norwegian diplomats seem to have been 
somewhat reluctant to move into the new position, but being political realists they moved 
with the times and shifted their position to recognize the value of having good Sino-
Norwegian relations. This is something the agreement of 1931 would bring about while it 
also would ensure that Norway awaited its abolishment of extraterritoriality until the 
larger foreign powers also abolished theirs, and as such Norway toed the line towards 
international society, especially towards Britain.     
Finally, it is important to emphasise that a vital aspect of this research has been to 
examine one of the smaller treaty powers' role in this political structure. As earlier 
mentioned, not much academic work has been written about the abolishment of 
extraterritoriality seen from a smaller nations' perspective. Therefore I hope that this 
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outlook has contributed new information that may be useful in future studies for better 
understanding extraterritoriality as a historical concept. 
 
 7.1 Future Research 
  
Throughout this thesis we have gained a general understanding of how the Norwegian 
diplomats portrayed the practice of extraterritoriality in China. Another interesting 
narrative for future research would be to go one step further and examine the reasons 
for why the Norwegian diplomats pictured extraterritoriality the way that they did. This 
research would require an examination of what the lives of the Norwegian diplomats in 
China were like. It would also be important to investigate if their negativity towards the 
Chinese and their administration was justifiable or whether it was blind prejudice against 
a culture and its systems that they did not comprehend. Another study that could be built 
upon this research is to look further into the personal and professional lives of the 
diplomats by for instance writing Nicolai Aall's biography. This focus could also possibly 
study how Norwegian extraterritoriality was practiced in China by examining cases that 
were brought up for the Norwegian extraterritorial court in Shanghai. I found several 
letters concerning such cases when examining the primary sources in the Norwegian 
National Archives, but I had to discard these sources because they did not relate to the 
main focus of this thesis.  
Another interesting study that could be built upon this research would be a comparative 
study of the Norwegian role compared to that of the other smaller treaty powers. This 
research could investigate whether Norway's position differed in any way from what the 
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 English Summary 
 
In this master thesis I have investigated how and why Norway abolished its 
extraterritoriality in China. Extraterritoriality was a privilege that allowed Norwegians, as 
well as other foreign citizens in China, to be sentenced by their own national laws 
instead of the Chinese ones. This privilege was originally established by Great Britain in 
1842 and then later extended to other foreign powers throughout the 19th century. This 
happened mainly because Western nations deemed the Chinese laws to be unjust, 
brutal and arbitrary and thus incapable of guaranteeing the safety and judicial rights of 
its foreign population. Hence extraterritoriality was enjoyed by Western citizens for about 
a century until the mid 1940s.  
In this thesis I have examined how and why Norway positioned itself and participated in 
the abolishment-processes of foreign extraterritoriality in China. I have explored as well 
as investigated the correspondence between the Norwegian diplomats in China and the 
Norwegian government. I have through this examined how the correspondence reflects 
the Norwegian role within this process. I have also made use of several specialist 
studies that have researched extraterritoriality in China as a historical phenomenon, and 
thereby attempted to put my Norwegian findings into a greater context. I have also tried 
to see how the general historical developments in both China and Norway may be 
understood as contexts for the decisions that were made.    
Conclusively I have seen that Norway and China agreed in 1931 that Norway would 
abolish its extraterritoriality in China when all the other treaty powers did the same. This 
mutual understanding lasted for over a decade, Norwegian citizens thereby continued to 
enjoy their extraterritorial privileges while the negotiations between China and the great 
powers persisted. These negotiations lasted until the Second World War, when Great 
Britain and the United States agreed to abolish their extraterritoriality in 1943. Norway 
then followed their example and abolished its extraterritoriality the same year just as 
earlier promised. 
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 Norsk Sammendrag 
 
I denne masteroppgaven tar jeg for meg hvordan og hvorfor Norge avsluttet sin 
ekstraterritorialrett i Kina. Ekstraterritorialretten var et privilegium som tillot nordmenn, så 
vel som andre utenlandske borgere i Kina, retten til å bli dømt etter sitt eget lands lover 
istedenfor de kinesiske. Denne retten hadde opprinnelig blitt etablert av Storbritannia i 
1842 og senere utvidet til andre vestlige land i løpet av det nittende århundret. Dette 
skjedde i hovedsak fordi de vestlige nasjonene mente at kinesiske lover var urettferdige, 
brutale og vilkårlige og dermed ute av stand for å kunne garantere sikkerhet og rettferdig 
behandling av utlendingene. Dermed benyttet vestlige lands borgere seg av denne 
retten i nærmere hundre år, helt frem til midten av 1940-tallet.  
I denne masteroppgaven har jeg undersøkt hvordan Norge stilte seg til, og deltok i, 
aviklingsprossessene av ekstraterritorrialretten. Jeg har gjennomgått og undersøkt 
korrespondansen mellom de norske diplomatene i Kina og styresmaktene i Norge. 
Gjennom dette arbeidet har jeg sett hvordan denne korrespondansen reflekterer Norges 
rolle i denne prosessen. Jeg har også benyttet meg av en rekke tidligere studier som har 
undersøkt ekstraterritorialretten i Kina som et historisk fenomen, og med dette prøvd å 
sette mine norske funn inn i en større kontekst. På samme vis har jeg også forsøkt å se 
hvordan den generelle historiske utviklingen i Kina, så vel som i Norge, har hatt relevans 
for de beslutninger som ble tatt.  
Avslutningsvis så jeg sett at Norge og Kina inngikk en avtale i 1931 der Norge lovet Kina 
å avvikle sin ekstraterritorrialrett når alle andre nasjoner med denne rettigheten også 
gjorde det. Denne bilatterale overenskomsten gjaldt i over ti år, da norske borgere 
fremdeles kunne benytte seg av ekstraterritorialrettighetene mens forhandlingene 
forsatte mellom Kina og stormaktene. Disse forhandlingne varte helt frem til andre 
verdenskrig, da Storbritannia og USA oppgav sine ekstraterritorriale rettigheter i 1943. 
Deretter fulgte Norge deres eksempel og oppgav, som avtalt, sine ekstraterritorriale 
rettigheter samme år.  
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